President and CEO Gigi Sohn's oral testimony is available as a PDF here. The written testimony, available below, is also available as a PDF here.
Testimony of Gigi B. Sohn
President, Public Knowledge
Before the
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and
Commerce
Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology
Hearing On:
“The Future of Video”
Washington, DC
June 27, 2012
Chairman Walden, Ranking Member Eshoo, members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to talk about the future of
video. My name is Gigi Sohn, and I
am President of Public Knowledge, a non-profit public interest organization
that seeks to ensure that the public benefits from a communications system that
is open, competitive and affordable.
Introduction
There is widespread agreement that we are currently living in the
golden age of television. Programs
like Mad Men, Breaking Bad, Game of Thrones,
Modern Family, The Daily Show and The
Colbert Report have become part of our cultural landscape, and even in this
era of 500 channels, still inspire discussions around the water cooler. There are numerous new ways to
watch TV – be it on a flat screen LED television, on a tablet or on a
smartphone. And the Internet
and DVRs have the ability to allow a viewer to watch what they want to watch
when they want to watch it.
Despite all of the great programming and groundbreaking devices,
Americans are locked into a television business model that limits competition
and choice; keeps prices for video high and limits technology and online video
from achieving their full potential.
This business model is made possible largely by an outdated regulatory
structure created by incumbents to gain competitive advantage. It is time for Congress and the
FCC to revamp this regulatory structure so that new video competition can
thrive – giving consumers greater options and the ability to watch video
whenever they want and on the device of their choosing.
Congress and the FCC can achieve this goal in three ways. First,
they can clear away some of the outdated rules that slow down the evolution of
the video marketplace. Second, they can extend the successful policies that
allow competitors to access high-value content to certain online providers.
Third, they can protect Internet openness and prevent discriminatory billing
practices that hold back online video. By doing this they will increase
competition, which will mean lower prices, better services, and more
flexibility and control for consumers.
Background
For nearly a century the federal government has shaped the
development of electronic media. In the 1920s the Federal Radio Commission
brought order to the chaotic and experimental landscape that characterized
early broadcasting. In doing so it set the conditions that allowed radio and
then television broadcasting to develop into what it was in its heyday, and
what it is today. In the 1960s and 1970s the FCC took steps to protect
broadcasting from the disorganized and innovative early cable industry.[1] By doing
this it made sure that cable became an adjunct to rather than a replacement for
established broadcasting.[2]
After Congress passed the Cable Act of 1984, the tables turned and
cable became the monopoly. Cable operators controlled who did and didn’t get on
the new medium, using their power to require cable programmers, such as the
fledgling CNN and Discovery, to provide “pay for play” equity interests to
cable operators, or sign exclusive agreements prohibiting programmers like MTV
from appearing on potential competitors such as Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS). At the same time, cable operators received access to needed inputs such
as poll attachment rights and broadcast programming. The lack of competition
led to high prices and poor service, but the cable incumbents’ control over
“must have” programming made it impossible for any competing services to
emerge.
It was not until the 1992 Cable Act[3] that
Congress embarked on an express policy of increasing competition in the television
market. It realized that potential competitors needed access to the same
content as large cable systems with market power. New laws such as program access rules that gave competitors
access to programming owned by the cable operators, and program carriage rules
that prevented cable operators from demanding an equity share as a condition of
carriage (”pay for play”), helped make it possible for new “multi-channel video
programming” providers (MVPDs) to compete with cable operators, as did changes
to the law to make it easier for competitors to get access to broadcast programming.[4] These policies of increasing
competition were somewhat successful but their promise was not entirely fulfilled.[5] They
enabled some new competitors to operate but these new competitors did not
change the fundamental shape of the market. They did not slow the increasing
power of cable generally and a few large cable companies in particular.[6] And they
did little or nothing to keep the market from consolidating in ways detrimental
to consumers and independent content producers alike.
The Internet is changing the video marketplace just as it changed
the market for music, news, books, and other forms of media. But it’s not a
foregone conclusion that the Internet will disrupt
the video marketplace. Dominant players in the market today have control both
over the content their nascent online competitors need for their service, and
over the pipes they must use to reach consumers. As a result much high-value
programming is not available online, and online video providers have to contend
with artificially low bandwidth caps and other discriminatory practices that
keep them from reaching their full potential.
Thus while it’s inevitable that IP technologies and the Internet
will play an ever-larger part of video delivery, it remains an open question
whether consumers or incumbents with market power will enjoy the lion’s share
of the benefits. Consumers will still suffer from a lack of choice and
independent content producers will still struggle to reach viewers if existing
incumbents in the content and the MVPD industry continue to thwart disruptive
change and manage the transition for their own benefit. Congress should once
again take the necessary steps to ensure that incumbents cannot throttle
(literally as well as figuratively) the legions of potential competitors trying
to reach willing consumers.
At the same time, Congress should prune away the needless overgrowth
of older rules, like syndicated exclusivity, the sports blackout rule and the
network non-duplication rule, that exist only to protect the business model of
local broadcasting. Senator DeMint and Representative Scalise are on the right
track with their bill that would clear away much of the regulatory underbrush
that holds back the evolution of the video marketplace,[7] although
the bill goes too far by eliminating ownership restrictions still needed to
maintain diversity in traditional media. Some other rules, like retransmission
consent and the compulsory copyright license, are outdated, but part of an
interwoven fabric of regulatory and business expectations. They should be
reformed, but cautiously.
At the same time, measures that are designed to mitigate the market
power of certain large video providers should not be repealed until true
competition develops. In some respects they should be extended. For example,
online video providers that wish to voluntarily operate as “multichannel video programming
distributors” (MVPDs) under Title VI of the Communications Act[8] should be
able to do so, as this would enable them to access certain valuable content and
protect them against anticompetitive actions by incumbents.[9] This would
ensure that consumers had more choices for high-value content than they do
today and would eliminate the incentives that keep certain content from being
licensed widely.
Finally, the fact that the largest residential broadband ISPs, such
as Comcast, are also MVPDs invested in the existing video distribution models
raises concerns. These ISP/MVPDs can impose a variety of policies that prevent
genuinely disruptive competition. For example, the ability to control how much
data subscribers may access through data caps, the ability to privilege some
content over others through prioritization or exemption from data caps, and the
ability to control what devices can connect to the network, give cable
operators (and other broadband providers like FIOS) the ability to pick winners
and losers just as cable operators did from 1984 to 1992.
Detailed Analysis and Recommendations
The video marketplace is unique, not only because of its
complicated business and regulatory structures, but because video incumbents
are better placed to counter the threat the Internet poses to their business
models. They do this in varied and creative ways.
Threats to Internet Openness
For a long time it looked as though ISPs would continue doing
what Comcast did when it started degrading BitTorrent traffic—picking and
choosing which Internet protocols and services got preferential or
discriminatory treatment. But recently ISPs have found that it is more
effective to discriminate via billing practices. Some ISPs have set their
bandwidth caps so low as to make it financially unattractive to switch over entirely
to online video, as this would put viewers over their caps and perhaps subject
them to overage charges.[10]
At the same time, at least one ISP exempts its own video services that are
delivered over the same infrastructure from the caps.[11]
These practices disadvantage services like Netflix and Amazon Instant Video and
relegate most online video to the role of a supplement to, rather than
replacement for, traditional MVPD services.
To counter this, Congress needs to stand behind the FCC’s
attempts to protect Internet openness.[12]
At the same time these protections need to be strengthened, their loopholes
need to be closed, and they need to take into account the fact that that
discrimination can happen through billing, as well as through Internet “fast
lanes” and other forms of technological discrimination.
Restrictions on the Availability of Content
The current regulatory system makes it so that incumbent MVPDs
but not online providers can carry broadcast content,[13]
and it makes it easy for incumbents to share content with each other while
keeping it out of the hands of potential new competitors.[14]
And while it’s unlawful for incumbent providers to behave anti-competitively
towards each other, they are free to keep their content away from online
services, and to use exclusionary contracts and “most favored nation” clauses
to limit the online distribution of independent programming.[15]
As a result, while a lot of very good video programming is
available online, the most popular programming is not.[16]
Popular broadcast and cable channels are not available online. Many popular
shows are not available online at all or are only made available after a
“windowing” period. Some programs are put online reasonably promptly, but are only
viewable in inconvenient ways. Some of the best online content is only
available to viewers who also have cable subscriptions, through TV Everywhere
and similar efforts. Live sports, and especially live local sports, are
generally not available online at all. Thus, while online services make it easy
to watch great documentaries, classic movies, and old sitcoms, the kinds of
culturally-current programming that people talk about at the office and online
are usually not available without a cable or satellite subscription.
This problem would be largely abated if online providers like
Sky Angel were permitted to operate as MVPDs, like they want to.[17]
The rules that ensure that all MVPDs can access certain content would then
protect them as well as incumbents. At the same time, the FCC should find that
the current rules that prohibit incumbents from behaving anti-competitively
toward each other also prohibit them from taking anti-competitive acts against
even those online video providers that choose not to operate as MVPDs.[18]
But even short of that, if more content were available from online services
that might choose to operate as MVPDs, the incentive to keep content offline
would evaporate to the benefit of the entire video marketplace.
The current pay TV MVPD model is very lucrative for some
because it forces viewers to pay for programming they don’t want. Even some
popular programmers like Time Warner, who have no direct stake in the cable
business, find it more profitable to give exclusives to MVPDs than to make
their programming available to willing buyers online.[19]
This is because people pay for large bundles of cable channels, some of which
are very expensive, even if they only want to watch a few.[20]
Every cable subscriber has to pay for broadcast channels, even though they are
available over the air for free. This leads to high prices that just keep
getting higher. The result of all
of this is a loss for consumers.
One quick way to fix this would be to scrap the rules that
require that cable systems carry broadcast stations as part of their basic tier—customers
should be able to choose what they pay for. And while video providers should be
free to bundle content and should not be required to offer everything a la
carte, it seems logical that increased competition from online providers would
force today’s providers to begin offering their customers more flexibility.
Marketplace Consolidation
The merger between Comcast and NBC Universal brought a large
amount of programming under the control of a cable system that has an incentive
to limit its distribution online.[21]
While it is true that both the Department of Justice and the FCC conditioned
their transaction on Comcast’s commitment to make certain programming available
to online distributors,[22]
as Public Knowledge has argued, behavioral remedies are, in general,
insufficient to overcome all the anti-competitive effects of mergers, joint
ventures, and other structural changes that create incentives to limit
distribution and innovation.[23]
Unfortunately, yet another such change has been proposed, whereby Verizon and
several large cable companies plan to create various joint entities to develop
new video technologies and to market each other’s products rather than compete.[24]
In addition to limiting competition in existing markets, these arrangements
could mean that much video in the future will be locked up in proprietary
platforms, and could mean that anticompetitive “authentication” schemes like TV
Everywhere become even more widespread. If policymakers truly wish to safeguard
the future of video, they should prevent these sorts of anticompetitive
agreements from taking place.
Outdated Rules That Protect Incumbent
Business Models
Protectionist Measures
Finally, there are some rules on the books today that seem
designed to prop up legacy business models and have long outlived any functions
they may once have served. Many of them can and should be repealed today.
Examples of these include sports blackout rules, network nonduplication, and
syndicated exclusivity provisions,[25]
and the previously-mentioned rule that requires that all MVPD viewers pay for
free over-the-air television.[26]
Some of these rules were passed to protect aspects of the video distribution
system from disruption before Internet video was a possibility, and when it
seemed that if local broadcasters lost revenue nothing could replace them.
Exclusivity rules not only keep cable systems from carrying signals from
“distant” markets but they prevent networks from distributing content on a
non-exclusive basis. The world these rules were written for is gone now and
they have outlived their purpose. Some local broadcasters never provided unique
local programming, and the various public goals that they provide can be
achieved more effectively through other means. Traditional models of video distribution are still valuable,
and local broadcasters who serve their communities will continue to thrive
after any regulatory reform. But
the broadcasting industry no longer needs extraordinary protection against
changes in technology, business models, and viewer behavior.
Outdated, but Complex Rules
Some other rules are outdated, but so interconnected with
other rules and marketplace expectations that they need to be approached
carefully. Among these are the compulsory copyright license,[27]
retransmission consent,[28]
and must-carry.[29] The
compulsory license cannot be reformed unless video providers are given
assurance that they never have to stop carrying programming just because they
don’t know whom to contact for a license, and to make sure that they can cope
with any potential holdout problems. And it would make no sense to embark on a
comprehensive reform of the laws governing video carriage in a way that
replicated the problems that afflict the retransmission consent process today,
while introducing new ones. Short of dealing with the compulsory license and
retransmission consent together, several reforms could improve the current
retransmission consent process. Many of the rules that have already been
mentioned give an unfair advantage to broadcasters and drive up the rates they
can charge. And some broadcasters have engaged in brinksmanship tactics that
harm viewers, where they pull their signals from MVPDs right before
high-profile events.[30] These
problems can at least be alleviated with meaningful “good faith” standards that
discourage unfair negotiation tactics, and interim carriage requirements that
minimize disruption to viewers.[31]
Finally, while the must-carry system is used by many low-value broadcasters in
ways that Congress never intended, public and non-commercial stations continue
to serve a valuable role and policymakers should find ways to protect the good
that they do.
Policies That Are Still Needed
Still other rules serve a function and should be maintained,
at least until competition develops. These include the program access, program
carriage rules, as well as set-top box competition rules. The program access
rules and related protections prevent any one MVPD from having exclusive rights
to content. Although the video market is not as competitive as it can be in the
Internet age, the fact remains that the American video distribution market is
more competitive than that of many other countries. The program access rules
are to thank for that, and they should be extended to all services that wish to
operate as MVPDs, even ones that are exclusively online. Similarly, the program
carriage system, which protects independent programmers from the negative
effects of bottleneck control by some MVPDs, still serves a role in ensuring
that viewers can enjoy content from diverse sources. Lastly, the directive expressed by Congress under Section
629 to have true set-top box competition has remained largely unfulfilled. Until Internet-delivered video becomes
a true substitution, preserving the FCC’s authority to promote set-top box
competition will remain necessary.
Copyright and Spectrum Policy
There are two
other kinds of regulations that can hold back the development of online video. Policymakers don’t always see them as
“regulations” in the same sense as things like syndicated exclusivity. But
copyright and spectrum laws are regulations nonetheless, and they have profound
effects on the shape of the market.
Copyright law shouldn’t be misused to hold back the evolution
of the video marketplace. Dish is being sued for making a DVR that’s too
sophisticated for the taste of some networks. But it’s not illegal to skip
commercials or for users to take full advantage of their home recording rights.[32]
And Aereo’s remote antenna is legal just as Cablevision’s remote DVR is.[33]
Copyrights are limited monopolies granted by the government, and they come with
a series of limitations and exceptions designed to protect users as well as
creators. They should not be a weapon used to limit experimentation with
business models and services.
Nor should misplaced fears of piracy keep content offline.
Some content industry executives have a view of technology and the Internet
that can only be described as superstitious, and they think that if they give
people access to content they’ll lose control of it. But recent history shows
that most people only turn to piracy when content is not available online
though other means. From the perspective of limiting copyright infringement,
limiting online distribution is simply counterproductive. This is why it is
particularly distressing that recent trade agreements contain language that
could be interpreted as limiting the possibilities of online video distribution.[34]
To whom the government assigns spectrum and for what purpose
it allocates it also has an impact on the video marketplace. As long as
broadcasters use the public airwaves they will have public responsibilities.
For example, they must operate transparently,[35]
they must serve the needs of their communities,[36]
and they cannot behave unreasonably in retransmission negotiations.[37]
While it is true that fewer people rely on over-the-air television today than
they did in its peak, due to the increasing costs of cable, a new generation of
viewers is getting familiar with rabbit ears.[38]
Thus, to say that broadcasting is no longer relevant is just as wrong as to say
that it should remain at the center of the video marketplace. In a more
competitive video marketplace there will no doubt be room for many different
kinds of services. The solution is not to enshrine or attack broadcasting but
to incentivize them to create great content, and to adopt policies that allow
spectrum to be put to other uses. Not only would this be beneficial to
communications policy generally but the impact on the video marketplace would
be profound, as distribution channels adapt to fit a more decentralized and dynamic
marketplace.
Conclusion
As they have in the past policymakers are starting to
consider the implications of increasing change in the market for video
distribution. History provides examples both of protectionist regulations that
should be avoided today, and of pro-competitive measures that serve as more
positive precedents. But today is different in one way: Finally, the technology
exists that could eliminate the physical, bottleneck control of video
distribution that has existed in various forms for decades. If policymakers
take some simple steps to facilitate the development of competitive online
video they can begin to disengage from regulations that were designed to
counter the effects of this bottleneck control. However, if they fail to do
this, it is likely that incumbents will be able to continue to shape the
development of the video market and extend their current dominance
indefinitely. While the Internet provides grounds for hoping that the future of
video will be better for consumers, policymakers have a lot of work to do to
help make that happen.
[1] See United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US 157 (1968). This case, in addition
to being an important case setting out the bounds of FCC authority, contains a
summary of the FCC’s early efforts at cable regulation. See also Office of
Telecommunications Policy, Cable: Report to the President (1974), which
contains an early history of the cable industry and attempts at cable
regulation, as well as policy recommendations.
[2] The 1974
OSTP Report said that “cable is not merely an extension or improvement of
broadcast television. It has the potential to become an important and entirely
new communications medium, open while and available to all.” OSTP Report at 13.
But cable did succeed in providing viewers with more content it fell short of
this early promise, and the regulatory system that developed ensured that cable
extending the reach of broadcasting instead of developing into a competitor to
it.
[3] Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, PL 102-385, 106
Stat. 1460 (1992).
[4] E.g., The
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub.L.
No. 106‑113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A‑526 to 1501A‑545 (Nov. 29, 1999).
[5] See Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, MB
Docket No. 06-189 (rel. Jan 16, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-206A1.pdf.
See also Comments of Public Knowledge
in Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 07-269 (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/PK_Comments_MVPD-Competition-Report.pdf.
[6] For example,
Adelphia’s cable assets were sold to Time Warner Cable and Comcast. See
Adelphia Sold to Time Warner, Comcast, Buffalo
Business First, April 21, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/stories/2005/04/18/daily37.html?page=all.
Comcast’s cable assets and NBC Universal have been combined in a joint venture
that is controlled by, and 51% owned by Comcast. See General Electric, New NBCU, http://www.ge.com/newnbcu.
[7] Next
Generation Television Marketplace Act, H.R. 3675 and S. 2008.
[9] See Comments of Public Knowledge in
Interpretation of the Terms “Multichannel Video Programming Distributor” and
“Channel” as Raised in Pending Program Access Proceeding, MB Docket No. 12-83
(filed May 14, 2012) (Sky Angel Comments), available
at http://www.publicknowledge.org/interpretation-mvpd.
[10] Andrew Odlyzko, Bill St. Arnaud, Erik Stallman,
& Michael Weinberg, Know Your Limits: Considering the Role of Data Caps and
Usage Based Billing in Internet Access Service 48 (Public Knowledge
2012) (“Comcast’s own estimate for the amount of data required to replace its
pay-television offering with an over the top competitor is 288 GB per month. In
light of this, it may come as no surprise that Comcast’s data cap is set at 250
GB per month.”). Comcast has since raised its cap, but it is worth observing
that the 288 GB per month figure is based on an unknown mix of standard and
high-definition content; presumably, a higher percentage of high-definition
video would lead to a higher figure. See
Mark Israel and Michael L. Katz, The
Comcast/NBCU Transaction and Online Video Distribution, Submitted by
Comcast Corporation, MB Docket No. 10-56 (May 4 2010) at 33, available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448237.
[11] Michael
Weinberg, Comcast Exempts Itself From Its
Data Cap, Violates (at least the) Spirit of Net Neutrality, Public Knowledge (March 26, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/comcast-exempts-itself-its-data-cap-violates-.
[12] Preserving
the Open Internet, Report & Order,
GN Docket No. 09-191, FCC 10-201, available
at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.pdf.
[13] 47 U.S.C. §
325; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64.
[14] 47 U.S.C. §
548. See Revision of the Commission’s
Program Access Rules, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 12-68, FCC 12-30 (rel. Mar. 20, 2012) for an
overview of the program access rules.
[15] Jon
Brodkin, DOJ probing Big Cable Over Online Video Competition, Ars
Technica, June 13, 2012 (noting that “[t]he DOJ is also investigating
contracts programmers sign to be distributed on cable systems, which include ‘most-favored
nation clauses’ that may favor cable companies over online video
distributors.”)
[16] See Carlos Kirjner, Internet TV (or Why
It Is So Hard to Go Over the Top), Bernstein Research (June 15, 2012).
[17] See Sky Angel Comments.
[18] As Public
Knowledge has argued,
The [FCC] should use its
authority over the video programming distribution market to protect online
video distribution generally, by prohibiting MVPDs from behaving
anticompetitively in ways that harm any video distributor, whether or not it is
an MVPD. Section 628 of the Communications Act provides authority for this.
This Section bans any actions “the purpose or effect of which is to hinder
significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor from
providing ... programming to subscribers or consumers.”The
close connection between the markets for MVPD and non-MVPD video distribution
mean that anticompetitive actions taken against an non-MVPD would likely have a
deleterious effect on the ability of a competitive MVPD to offer programming—for
example, by increasing its costs, or inhibiting the ability of an MVPD to offer
programming on demand or online.
Sky Angel Comments at 24-25.
[19] Brian
Stelter, HBO Says No, for Now, to Fans
Who Want a Web-Only Option, NY Times
Media Decoder, June 6, 2012, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/hbo-says-no-for-now-to-fans-who-want-a-web-only-option.
[20] Peter
Kafka, Hate Paying for Cable? Here’s Why,
AllThingsD, March 10, 2010, http://allthingsd.com/20100308/hate-paying-for-cable-heres-the-reason-why.
[21] Competitive
Impact Statement of the Department of Justice at 4, United States v. Comcast
Corp., 1:11-cv-00106, (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf
[22]
Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc., for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of
Licenses, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238 (2011); Final
Judgment in United States v. Comcast, United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Case No. 1:II-cv-00l06 (Sept. 1, 2011).
[23] Petition to
Deny of Public Knowledge and Future of Music Coalition in WT Docket No. 11-65
(filed May 31, 2011), at 62-70, available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/pk_fmc-att_tmo-petition_to_deny.pdf.
[24] See Petition to Deny of Public Knowledge
et al. in WT Docket No. 12-4 (filed Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/pk_verizon_spectrumco_petition.pdf.
[25] 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.92(f), 76.106(a), 76.111, 76.120, and 76.127-130.
[26] 47 C.F.R. §
76.901(a) ("The basic service tier shall, at a minimum, include all
signals of domestic television broadcast stations provided to any
subscriber"); 47 C.F.R. § 76.920 ("Every subscriber of a cable system
must subscribe to the basic tier in order to subscribe to any other tier of
video programming or to purchase any other video programming.").
[28] 47
U.S.C. § 325; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64.
[29] 47 U.S.C. § 534; 47 C.F.R. § 76.55.
[30] Amendment
of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
26 FCC Rcd. 2718, ¶15 (2011).
[31] See Comments of Public Knowledge and New
America Foundation in MB Docket No. 10-71 (filed May 27, 2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/11-05-27PK-NAF_retrans_comments.pdf.
[32] See John Bergmayer, Networks Pull the Trigger on Dish, but They're Only Hurting Themselves,
Public Knowledge (May 25, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/networks-pull-trigger-against-dish-theyre-onl.
[33] See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic
Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge in WNET
v. Aereo, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Case No. 1:12-cv-01543-AJN, available
at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/aereo_amici_brief.pdf.
[34] Many free
trade agreements appear to state that online retransmission may not occur
without the permission both of the owner of the copyright in the programming,
and of the broadcaster. This is at odds with the current system of a compulsory
license plus retransmission consent, which requires MVPDs to obtain the
permission only of the signal owner, not of the content owners. Some current
reform proposals involve requiring an MVPD to obtain the permission of the
copyright holders instead of the permission of the broadcaster, but not of
both. See John Bergmayer, The US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Policy
Laundering in Action, Public
Knowledge (April 20, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/us-colombia-laundering.
But see Comments of ABC, CBS, and NBC
Television Affiliates in MB Docket No. 12-83 (filed June 13, 2012), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021922660
(arguing that it would be consistent with the agreements if online systems were
categorized as MVPDs and subsequently followed standard retransmission consent
procedures).
[35] See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (public file
requirement).
[36] 47 C.F.R. §
73.3526(e)(11)(i).
[37] 47 U.S.C.
§§ 325(b)(3)(C)(ii), (iii).
[38] Christopher
S. Stewart, Over-the-Air TV Catches
Second Wind, Aided by the Web, Wall
Street Journal (Feb. 21, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204059804577229451364593094.html
(“It's cool to have rabbit ears again.”).
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[title] => Gigi Sohn's Testimony before the House E&C Committee RE: Future of Video
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President and CEO Gigi Sohn's oral testimony is available as a PDF here. The written testimony, available below, is also available as a PDF here.
Testimony of Gigi B. Sohn
President, Public Knowledge
Before the
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and
Commerce
Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology
Hearing On:
“The Future of Video”
Washington, DC
June 27, 2012
Chairman Walden, Ranking Member Eshoo, members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to talk about the future of
video. My name is Gigi Sohn, and I
am President of Public Knowledge, a non-profit public interest organization
that seeks to ensure that the public benefits from a communications system that
is open, competitive and affordable.
Introduction
There is widespread agreement that we are currently living in the
golden age of television. Programs
like Mad Men, Breaking Bad, Game of Thrones,
Modern Family, The Daily Show and The
Colbert Report have become part of our cultural landscape, and even in this
era of 500 channels, still inspire discussions around the water cooler. There are numerous new ways to
watch TV – be it on a flat screen LED television, on a tablet or on a
smartphone. And the Internet
and DVRs have the ability to allow a viewer to watch what they want to watch
when they want to watch it.
Despite all of the great programming and groundbreaking devices,
Americans are locked into a television business model that limits competition
and choice; keeps prices for video high and limits technology and online video
from achieving their full potential.
This business model is made possible largely by an outdated regulatory
structure created by incumbents to gain competitive advantage. It is time for Congress and the
FCC to revamp this regulatory structure so that new video competition can
thrive – giving consumers greater options and the ability to watch video
whenever they want and on the device of their choosing.
Congress and the FCC can achieve this goal in three ways. First,
they can clear away some of the outdated rules that slow down the evolution of
the video marketplace. Second, they can extend the successful policies that
allow competitors to access high-value content to certain online providers.
Third, they can protect Internet openness and prevent discriminatory billing
practices that hold back online video. By doing this they will increase
competition, which will mean lower prices, better services, and more
flexibility and control for consumers.
Background
For nearly a century the federal government has shaped the
development of electronic media. In the 1920s the Federal Radio Commission
brought order to the chaotic and experimental landscape that characterized
early broadcasting. In doing so it set the conditions that allowed radio and
then television broadcasting to develop into what it was in its heyday, and
what it is today. In the 1960s and 1970s the FCC took steps to protect
broadcasting from the disorganized and innovative early cable industry.[1] By doing
this it made sure that cable became an adjunct to rather than a replacement for
established broadcasting.[2]
After Congress passed the Cable Act of 1984, the tables turned and
cable became the monopoly. Cable operators controlled who did and didn’t get on
the new medium, using their power to require cable programmers, such as the
fledgling CNN and Discovery, to provide “pay for play” equity interests to
cable operators, or sign exclusive agreements prohibiting programmers like MTV
from appearing on potential competitors such as Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS). At the same time, cable operators received access to needed inputs such
as poll attachment rights and broadcast programming. The lack of competition
led to high prices and poor service, but the cable incumbents’ control over
“must have” programming made it impossible for any competing services to
emerge.
It was not until the 1992 Cable Act[3] that
Congress embarked on an express policy of increasing competition in the television
market. It realized that potential competitors needed access to the same
content as large cable systems with market power. New laws such as program access rules that gave competitors
access to programming owned by the cable operators, and program carriage rules
that prevented cable operators from demanding an equity share as a condition of
carriage (”pay for play”), helped make it possible for new “multi-channel video
programming” providers (MVPDs) to compete with cable operators, as did changes
to the law to make it easier for competitors to get access to broadcast programming.[4] These policies of increasing
competition were somewhat successful but their promise was not entirely fulfilled.[5] They
enabled some new competitors to operate but these new competitors did not
change the fundamental shape of the market. They did not slow the increasing
power of cable generally and a few large cable companies in particular.[6] And they
did little or nothing to keep the market from consolidating in ways detrimental
to consumers and independent content producers alike.
The Internet is changing the video marketplace just as it changed
the market for music, news, books, and other forms of media. But it’s not a
foregone conclusion that the Internet will disrupt
the video marketplace. Dominant players in the market today have control both
over the content their nascent online competitors need for their service, and
over the pipes they must use to reach consumers. As a result much high-value
programming is not available online, and online video providers have to contend
with artificially low bandwidth caps and other discriminatory practices that
keep them from reaching their full potential.
Thus while it’s inevitable that IP technologies and the Internet
will play an ever-larger part of video delivery, it remains an open question
whether consumers or incumbents with market power will enjoy the lion’s share
of the benefits. Consumers will still suffer from a lack of choice and
independent content producers will still struggle to reach viewers if existing
incumbents in the content and the MVPD industry continue to thwart disruptive
change and manage the transition for their own benefit. Congress should once
again take the necessary steps to ensure that incumbents cannot throttle
(literally as well as figuratively) the legions of potential competitors trying
to reach willing consumers.
At the same time, Congress should prune away the needless overgrowth
of older rules, like syndicated exclusivity, the sports blackout rule and the
network non-duplication rule, that exist only to protect the business model of
local broadcasting. Senator DeMint and Representative Scalise are on the right
track with their bill that would clear away much of the regulatory underbrush
that holds back the evolution of the video marketplace,[7] although
the bill goes too far by eliminating ownership restrictions still needed to
maintain diversity in traditional media. Some other rules, like retransmission
consent and the compulsory copyright license, are outdated, but part of an
interwoven fabric of regulatory and business expectations. They should be
reformed, but cautiously.
At the same time, measures that are designed to mitigate the market
power of certain large video providers should not be repealed until true
competition develops. In some respects they should be extended. For example,
online video providers that wish to voluntarily operate as “multichannel video programming
distributors” (MVPDs) under Title VI of the Communications Act[8] should be
able to do so, as this would enable them to access certain valuable content and
protect them against anticompetitive actions by incumbents.[9] This would
ensure that consumers had more choices for high-value content than they do
today and would eliminate the incentives that keep certain content from being
licensed widely.
Finally, the fact that the largest residential broadband ISPs, such
as Comcast, are also MVPDs invested in the existing video distribution models
raises concerns. These ISP/MVPDs can impose a variety of policies that prevent
genuinely disruptive competition. For example, the ability to control how much
data subscribers may access through data caps, the ability to privilege some
content over others through prioritization or exemption from data caps, and the
ability to control what devices can connect to the network, give cable
operators (and other broadband providers like FIOS) the ability to pick winners
and losers just as cable operators did from 1984 to 1992.
Detailed Analysis and Recommendations
The video marketplace is unique, not only because of its
complicated business and regulatory structures, but because video incumbents
are better placed to counter the threat the Internet poses to their business
models. They do this in varied and creative ways.
Threats to Internet Openness
For a long time it looked as though ISPs would continue doing
what Comcast did when it started degrading BitTorrent traffic—picking and
choosing which Internet protocols and services got preferential or
discriminatory treatment. But recently ISPs have found that it is more
effective to discriminate via billing practices. Some ISPs have set their
bandwidth caps so low as to make it financially unattractive to switch over entirely
to online video, as this would put viewers over their caps and perhaps subject
them to overage charges.[10]
At the same time, at least one ISP exempts its own video services that are
delivered over the same infrastructure from the caps.[11]
These practices disadvantage services like Netflix and Amazon Instant Video and
relegate most online video to the role of a supplement to, rather than
replacement for, traditional MVPD services.
To counter this, Congress needs to stand behind the FCC’s
attempts to protect Internet openness.[12]
At the same time these protections need to be strengthened, their loopholes
need to be closed, and they need to take into account the fact that that
discrimination can happen through billing, as well as through Internet “fast
lanes” and other forms of technological discrimination.
Restrictions on the Availability of Content
The current regulatory system makes it so that incumbent MVPDs
but not online providers can carry broadcast content,[13]
and it makes it easy for incumbents to share content with each other while
keeping it out of the hands of potential new competitors.[14]
And while it’s unlawful for incumbent providers to behave anti-competitively
towards each other, they are free to keep their content away from online
services, and to use exclusionary contracts and “most favored nation” clauses
to limit the online distribution of independent programming.[15]
As a result, while a lot of very good video programming is
available online, the most popular programming is not.[16]
Popular broadcast and cable channels are not available online. Many popular
shows are not available online at all or are only made available after a
“windowing” period. Some programs are put online reasonably promptly, but are only
viewable in inconvenient ways. Some of the best online content is only
available to viewers who also have cable subscriptions, through TV Everywhere
and similar efforts. Live sports, and especially live local sports, are
generally not available online at all. Thus, while online services make it easy
to watch great documentaries, classic movies, and old sitcoms, the kinds of
culturally-current programming that people talk about at the office and online
are usually not available without a cable or satellite subscription.
This problem would be largely abated if online providers like
Sky Angel were permitted to operate as MVPDs, like they want to.[17]
The rules that ensure that all MVPDs can access certain content would then
protect them as well as incumbents. At the same time, the FCC should find that
the current rules that prohibit incumbents from behaving anti-competitively
toward each other also prohibit them from taking anti-competitive acts against
even those online video providers that choose not to operate as MVPDs.[18]
But even short of that, if more content were available from online services
that might choose to operate as MVPDs, the incentive to keep content offline
would evaporate to the benefit of the entire video marketplace.
The current pay TV MVPD model is very lucrative for some
because it forces viewers to pay for programming they don’t want. Even some
popular programmers like Time Warner, who have no direct stake in the cable
business, find it more profitable to give exclusives to MVPDs than to make
their programming available to willing buyers online.[19]
This is because people pay for large bundles of cable channels, some of which
are very expensive, even if they only want to watch a few.[20]
Every cable subscriber has to pay for broadcast channels, even though they are
available over the air for free. This leads to high prices that just keep
getting higher. The result of all
of this is a loss for consumers.
One quick way to fix this would be to scrap the rules that
require that cable systems carry broadcast stations as part of their basic tier—customers
should be able to choose what they pay for. And while video providers should be
free to bundle content and should not be required to offer everything a la
carte, it seems logical that increased competition from online providers would
force today’s providers to begin offering their customers more flexibility.
Marketplace Consolidation
The merger between Comcast and NBC Universal brought a large
amount of programming under the control of a cable system that has an incentive
to limit its distribution online.[21]
While it is true that both the Department of Justice and the FCC conditioned
their transaction on Comcast’s commitment to make certain programming available
to online distributors,[22]
as Public Knowledge has argued, behavioral remedies are, in general,
insufficient to overcome all the anti-competitive effects of mergers, joint
ventures, and other structural changes that create incentives to limit
distribution and innovation.[23]
Unfortunately, yet another such change has been proposed, whereby Verizon and
several large cable companies plan to create various joint entities to develop
new video technologies and to market each other’s products rather than compete.[24]
In addition to limiting competition in existing markets, these arrangements
could mean that much video in the future will be locked up in proprietary
platforms, and could mean that anticompetitive “authentication” schemes like TV
Everywhere become even more widespread. If policymakers truly wish to safeguard
the future of video, they should prevent these sorts of anticompetitive
agreements from taking place.
Outdated Rules That Protect Incumbent
Business Models
Protectionist Measures
Finally, there are some rules on the books today that seem
designed to prop up legacy business models and have long outlived any functions
they may once have served. Many of them can and should be repealed today.
Examples of these include sports blackout rules, network nonduplication, and
syndicated exclusivity provisions,[25]
and the previously-mentioned rule that requires that all MVPD viewers pay for
free over-the-air television.[26]
Some of these rules were passed to protect aspects of the video distribution
system from disruption before Internet video was a possibility, and when it
seemed that if local broadcasters lost revenue nothing could replace them.
Exclusivity rules not only keep cable systems from carrying signals from
“distant” markets but they prevent networks from distributing content on a
non-exclusive basis. The world these rules were written for is gone now and
they have outlived their purpose. Some local broadcasters never provided unique
local programming, and the various public goals that they provide can be
achieved more effectively through other means. Traditional models of video distribution are still valuable,
and local broadcasters who serve their communities will continue to thrive
after any regulatory reform. But
the broadcasting industry no longer needs extraordinary protection against
changes in technology, business models, and viewer behavior.
Outdated, but Complex Rules
Some other rules are outdated, but so interconnected with
other rules and marketplace expectations that they need to be approached
carefully. Among these are the compulsory copyright license,[27]
retransmission consent,[28]
and must-carry.[29] The
compulsory license cannot be reformed unless video providers are given
assurance that they never have to stop carrying programming just because they
don’t know whom to contact for a license, and to make sure that they can cope
with any potential holdout problems. And it would make no sense to embark on a
comprehensive reform of the laws governing video carriage in a way that
replicated the problems that afflict the retransmission consent process today,
while introducing new ones. Short of dealing with the compulsory license and
retransmission consent together, several reforms could improve the current
retransmission consent process. Many of the rules that have already been
mentioned give an unfair advantage to broadcasters and drive up the rates they
can charge. And some broadcasters have engaged in brinksmanship tactics that
harm viewers, where they pull their signals from MVPDs right before
high-profile events.[30] These
problems can at least be alleviated with meaningful “good faith” standards that
discourage unfair negotiation tactics, and interim carriage requirements that
minimize disruption to viewers.[31]
Finally, while the must-carry system is used by many low-value broadcasters in
ways that Congress never intended, public and non-commercial stations continue
to serve a valuable role and policymakers should find ways to protect the good
that they do.
Policies That Are Still Needed
Still other rules serve a function and should be maintained,
at least until competition develops. These include the program access, program
carriage rules, as well as set-top box competition rules. The program access
rules and related protections prevent any one MVPD from having exclusive rights
to content. Although the video market is not as competitive as it can be in the
Internet age, the fact remains that the American video distribution market is
more competitive than that of many other countries. The program access rules
are to thank for that, and they should be extended to all services that wish to
operate as MVPDs, even ones that are exclusively online. Similarly, the program
carriage system, which protects independent programmers from the negative
effects of bottleneck control by some MVPDs, still serves a role in ensuring
that viewers can enjoy content from diverse sources. Lastly, the directive expressed by Congress under Section
629 to have true set-top box competition has remained largely unfulfilled. Until Internet-delivered video becomes
a true substitution, preserving the FCC’s authority to promote set-top box
competition will remain necessary.
Copyright and Spectrum Policy
There are two
other kinds of regulations that can hold back the development of online video. Policymakers don’t always see them as
“regulations” in the same sense as things like syndicated exclusivity. But
copyright and spectrum laws are regulations nonetheless, and they have profound
effects on the shape of the market.
Copyright law shouldn’t be misused to hold back the evolution
of the video marketplace. Dish is being sued for making a DVR that’s too
sophisticated for the taste of some networks. But it’s not illegal to skip
commercials or for users to take full advantage of their home recording rights.[32]
And Aereo’s remote antenna is legal just as Cablevision’s remote DVR is.[33]
Copyrights are limited monopolies granted by the government, and they come with
a series of limitations and exceptions designed to protect users as well as
creators. They should not be a weapon used to limit experimentation with
business models and services.
Nor should misplaced fears of piracy keep content offline.
Some content industry executives have a view of technology and the Internet
that can only be described as superstitious, and they think that if they give
people access to content they’ll lose control of it. But recent history shows
that most people only turn to piracy when content is not available online
though other means. From the perspective of limiting copyright infringement,
limiting online distribution is simply counterproductive. This is why it is
particularly distressing that recent trade agreements contain language that
could be interpreted as limiting the possibilities of online video distribution.[34]
To whom the government assigns spectrum and for what purpose
it allocates it also has an impact on the video marketplace. As long as
broadcasters use the public airwaves they will have public responsibilities.
For example, they must operate transparently,[35]
they must serve the needs of their communities,[36]
and they cannot behave unreasonably in retransmission negotiations.[37]
While it is true that fewer people rely on over-the-air television today than
they did in its peak, due to the increasing costs of cable, a new generation of
viewers is getting familiar with rabbit ears.[38]
Thus, to say that broadcasting is no longer relevant is just as wrong as to say
that it should remain at the center of the video marketplace. In a more
competitive video marketplace there will no doubt be room for many different
kinds of services. The solution is not to enshrine or attack broadcasting but
to incentivize them to create great content, and to adopt policies that allow
spectrum to be put to other uses. Not only would this be beneficial to
communications policy generally but the impact on the video marketplace would
be profound, as distribution channels adapt to fit a more decentralized and dynamic
marketplace.
Conclusion
As they have in the past policymakers are starting to
consider the implications of increasing change in the market for video
distribution. History provides examples both of protectionist regulations that
should be avoided today, and of pro-competitive measures that serve as more
positive precedents. But today is different in one way: Finally, the technology
exists that could eliminate the physical, bottleneck control of video
distribution that has existed in various forms for decades. If policymakers
take some simple steps to facilitate the development of competitive online
video they can begin to disengage from regulations that were designed to
counter the effects of this bottleneck control. However, if they fail to do
this, it is likely that incumbents will be able to continue to shape the
development of the video market and extend their current dominance
indefinitely. While the Internet provides grounds for hoping that the future of
video will be better for consumers, policymakers have a lot of work to do to
help make that happen.
[1] See United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US 157 (1968). This case, in addition
to being an important case setting out the bounds of FCC authority, contains a
summary of the FCC’s early efforts at cable regulation. See also Office of
Telecommunications Policy, Cable: Report to the President (1974), which
contains an early history of the cable industry and attempts at cable
regulation, as well as policy recommendations.
[2] The 1974
OSTP Report said that “cable is not merely an extension or improvement of
broadcast television. It has the potential to become an important and entirely
new communications medium, open while and available to all.” OSTP Report at 13.
But cable did succeed in providing viewers with more content it fell short of
this early promise, and the regulatory system that developed ensured that cable
extending the reach of broadcasting instead of developing into a competitor to
it.
[3] Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, PL 102-385, 106
Stat. 1460 (1992).
[4] E.g., The
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub.L.
No. 106‑113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A‑526 to 1501A‑545 (Nov. 29, 1999).
[5] See Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, MB
Docket No. 06-189 (rel. Jan 16, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-206A1.pdf.
See also Comments of Public Knowledge
in Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 07-269 (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/PK_Comments_MVPD-Competition-Report.pdf.
[6] For example,
Adelphia’s cable assets were sold to Time Warner Cable and Comcast. See
Adelphia Sold to Time Warner, Comcast, Buffalo
Business First, April 21, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/stories/2005/04/18/daily37.html?page=all.
Comcast’s cable assets and NBC Universal have been combined in a joint venture
that is controlled by, and 51% owned by Comcast. See General Electric, New NBCU, http://www.ge.com/newnbcu.
[7] Next
Generation Television Marketplace Act, H.R. 3675 and S. 2008.
[9] See Comments of Public Knowledge in
Interpretation of the Terms “Multichannel Video Programming Distributor” and
“Channel” as Raised in Pending Program Access Proceeding, MB Docket No. 12-83
(filed May 14, 2012) (Sky Angel Comments), available
at http://www.publicknowledge.org/interpretation-mvpd.
[10] Andrew Odlyzko, Bill St. Arnaud, Erik Stallman,
& Michael Weinberg, Know Your Limits: Considering the Role of Data Caps and
Usage Based Billing in Internet Access Service 48 (Public Knowledge
2012) (“Comcast’s own estimate for the amount of data required to replace its
pay-television offering with an over the top competitor is 288 GB per month. In
light of this, it may come as no surprise that Comcast’s data cap is set at 250
GB per month.”). Comcast has since raised its cap, but it is worth observing
that the 288 GB per month figure is based on an unknown mix of standard and
high-definition content; presumably, a higher percentage of high-definition
video would lead to a higher figure. See
Mark Israel and Michael L. Katz, The
Comcast/NBCU Transaction and Online Video Distribution, Submitted by
Comcast Corporation, MB Docket No. 10-56 (May 4 2010) at 33, available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448237.
[11] Michael
Weinberg, Comcast Exempts Itself From Its
Data Cap, Violates (at least the) Spirit of Net Neutrality, Public Knowledge (March 26, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/comcast-exempts-itself-its-data-cap-violates-.
[12] Preserving
the Open Internet, Report & Order,
GN Docket No. 09-191, FCC 10-201, available
at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.pdf.
[13] 47 U.S.C. §
325; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64.
[14] 47 U.S.C. §
548. See Revision of the Commission’s
Program Access Rules, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 12-68, FCC 12-30 (rel. Mar. 20, 2012) for an
overview of the program access rules.
[15] Jon
Brodkin, DOJ probing Big Cable Over Online Video Competition, Ars
Technica, June 13, 2012 (noting that “[t]he DOJ is also investigating
contracts programmers sign to be distributed on cable systems, which include ‘most-favored
nation clauses’ that may favor cable companies over online video
distributors.”)
[16] See Carlos Kirjner, Internet TV (or Why
It Is So Hard to Go Over the Top), Bernstein Research (June 15, 2012).
[17] See Sky Angel Comments.
[18] As Public
Knowledge has argued,
The [FCC] should use its
authority over the video programming distribution market to protect online
video distribution generally, by prohibiting MVPDs from behaving
anticompetitively in ways that harm any video distributor, whether or not it is
an MVPD. Section 628 of the Communications Act provides authority for this.
This Section bans any actions “the purpose or effect of which is to hinder
significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor from
providing ... programming to subscribers or consumers.”The
close connection between the markets for MVPD and non-MVPD video distribution
mean that anticompetitive actions taken against an non-MVPD would likely have a
deleterious effect on the ability of a competitive MVPD to offer programming—for
example, by increasing its costs, or inhibiting the ability of an MVPD to offer
programming on demand or online.
Sky Angel Comments at 24-25.
[19] Brian
Stelter, HBO Says No, for Now, to Fans
Who Want a Web-Only Option, NY Times
Media Decoder, June 6, 2012, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/hbo-says-no-for-now-to-fans-who-want-a-web-only-option.
[20] Peter
Kafka, Hate Paying for Cable? Here’s Why,
AllThingsD, March 10, 2010, http://allthingsd.com/20100308/hate-paying-for-cable-heres-the-reason-why.
[21] Competitive
Impact Statement of the Department of Justice at 4, United States v. Comcast
Corp., 1:11-cv-00106, (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf
[22]
Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc., for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of
Licenses, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238 (2011); Final
Judgment in United States v. Comcast, United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Case No. 1:II-cv-00l06 (Sept. 1, 2011).
[23] Petition to
Deny of Public Knowledge and Future of Music Coalition in WT Docket No. 11-65
(filed May 31, 2011), at 62-70, available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/pk_fmc-att_tmo-petition_to_deny.pdf.
[24] See Petition to Deny of Public Knowledge
et al. in WT Docket No. 12-4 (filed Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/pk_verizon_spectrumco_petition.pdf.
[25] 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.92(f), 76.106(a), 76.111, 76.120, and 76.127-130.
[26] 47 C.F.R. §
76.901(a) ("The basic service tier shall, at a minimum, include all
signals of domestic television broadcast stations provided to any
subscriber"); 47 C.F.R. § 76.920 ("Every subscriber of a cable system
must subscribe to the basic tier in order to subscribe to any other tier of
video programming or to purchase any other video programming.").
[28] 47
U.S.C. § 325; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64.
[29] 47 U.S.C. § 534; 47 C.F.R. § 76.55.
[30] Amendment
of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
26 FCC Rcd. 2718, ¶15 (2011).
[31] See Comments of Public Knowledge and New
America Foundation in MB Docket No. 10-71 (filed May 27, 2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/11-05-27PK-NAF_retrans_comments.pdf.
[32] See John Bergmayer, Networks Pull the Trigger on Dish, but They're Only Hurting Themselves,
Public Knowledge (May 25, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/networks-pull-trigger-against-dish-theyre-onl.
[33] See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic
Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge in WNET
v. Aereo, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Case No. 1:12-cv-01543-AJN, available
at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/aereo_amici_brief.pdf.
[34] Many free
trade agreements appear to state that online retransmission may not occur
without the permission both of the owner of the copyright in the programming,
and of the broadcaster. This is at odds with the current system of a compulsory
license plus retransmission consent, which requires MVPDs to obtain the
permission only of the signal owner, not of the content owners. Some current
reform proposals involve requiring an MVPD to obtain the permission of the
copyright holders instead of the permission of the broadcaster, but not of
both. See John Bergmayer, The US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Policy
Laundering in Action, Public
Knowledge (April 20, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/us-colombia-laundering.
But see Comments of ABC, CBS, and NBC
Television Affiliates in MB Docket No. 12-83 (filed June 13, 2012), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021922660
(arguing that it would be consistent with the agreements if online systems were
categorized as MVPDs and subsequently followed standard retransmission consent
procedures).
[35] See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (public file
requirement).
[36] 47 C.F.R. §
73.3526(e)(11)(i).
[37] 47 U.S.C.
§§ 325(b)(3)(C)(ii), (iii).
[38] Christopher
S. Stewart, Over-the-Air TV Catches
Second Wind, Aided by the Web, Wall
Street Journal (Feb. 21, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204059804577229451364593094.html
(“It's cool to have rabbit ears again.”).
[log] =>
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[#value] => President and CEO Gigi Sohn's oral testimony is available as a PDF here. The written testimony, available below, is also available as a PDF here.
Testimony of Gigi B. Sohn
President, Public Knowledge
Before the
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and
Commerce
Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology
Hearing On:
“The Future of Video”
Washington, DC
June 27, 2012
Chairman Walden, Ranking Member Eshoo, members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to talk about the future of
video. My name is Gigi Sohn, and I
am President of Public Knowledge, a non-profit public interest organization
that seeks to ensure that the public benefits from a communications system that
is open, competitive and affordable.
Introduction
There is widespread agreement that we are currently living in the
golden age of television. Programs
like Mad Men, Breaking Bad, Game of Thrones,
Modern Family, The Daily Show and The
Colbert Report have become part of our cultural landscape, and even in this
era of 500 channels, still inspire discussions around the water cooler. There are numerous new ways to
watch TV – be it on a flat screen LED television, on a tablet or on a
smartphone. And the Internet
and DVRs have the ability to allow a viewer to watch what they want to watch
when they want to watch it.
Despite all of the great programming and groundbreaking devices,
Americans are locked into a television business model that limits competition
and choice; keeps prices for video high and limits technology and online video
from achieving their full potential.
This business model is made possible largely by an outdated regulatory
structure created by incumbents to gain competitive advantage. It is time for Congress and the
FCC to revamp this regulatory structure so that new video competition can
thrive – giving consumers greater options and the ability to watch video
whenever they want and on the device of their choosing.
Congress and the FCC can achieve this goal in three ways. First,
they can clear away some of the outdated rules that slow down the evolution of
the video marketplace. Second, they can extend the successful policies that
allow competitors to access high-value content to certain online providers.
Third, they can protect Internet openness and prevent discriminatory billing
practices that hold back online video. By doing this they will increase
competition, which will mean lower prices, better services, and more
flexibility and control for consumers.
Background
For nearly a century the federal government has shaped the
development of electronic media. In the 1920s the Federal Radio Commission
brought order to the chaotic and experimental landscape that characterized
early broadcasting. In doing so it set the conditions that allowed radio and
then television broadcasting to develop into what it was in its heyday, and
what it is today. In the 1960s and 1970s the FCC took steps to protect
broadcasting from the disorganized and innovative early cable industry.[1] By doing
this it made sure that cable became an adjunct to rather than a replacement for
established broadcasting.[2]
After Congress passed the Cable Act of 1984, the tables turned and
cable became the monopoly. Cable operators controlled who did and didn’t get on
the new medium, using their power to require cable programmers, such as the
fledgling CNN and Discovery, to provide “pay for play” equity interests to
cable operators, or sign exclusive agreements prohibiting programmers like MTV
from appearing on potential competitors such as Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS). At the same time, cable operators received access to needed inputs such
as poll attachment rights and broadcast programming. The lack of competition
led to high prices and poor service, but the cable incumbents’ control over
“must have” programming made it impossible for any competing services to
emerge.
It was not until the 1992 Cable Act[3] that
Congress embarked on an express policy of increasing competition in the television
market. It realized that potential competitors needed access to the same
content as large cable systems with market power. New laws such as program access rules that gave competitors
access to programming owned by the cable operators, and program carriage rules
that prevented cable operators from demanding an equity share as a condition of
carriage (”pay for play”), helped make it possible for new “multi-channel video
programming” providers (MVPDs) to compete with cable operators, as did changes
to the law to make it easier for competitors to get access to broadcast programming.[4] These policies of increasing
competition were somewhat successful but their promise was not entirely fulfilled.[5] They
enabled some new competitors to operate but these new competitors did not
change the fundamental shape of the market. They did not slow the increasing
power of cable generally and a few large cable companies in particular.[6] And they
did little or nothing to keep the market from consolidating in ways detrimental
to consumers and independent content producers alike.
The Internet is changing the video marketplace just as it changed
the market for music, news, books, and other forms of media. But it’s not a
foregone conclusion that the Internet will disrupt
the video marketplace. Dominant players in the market today have control both
over the content their nascent online competitors need for their service, and
over the pipes they must use to reach consumers. As a result much high-value
programming is not available online, and online video providers have to contend
with artificially low bandwidth caps and other discriminatory practices that
keep them from reaching their full potential.
Thus while it’s inevitable that IP technologies and the Internet
will play an ever-larger part of video delivery, it remains an open question
whether consumers or incumbents with market power will enjoy the lion’s share
of the benefits. Consumers will still suffer from a lack of choice and
independent content producers will still struggle to reach viewers if existing
incumbents in the content and the MVPD industry continue to thwart disruptive
change and manage the transition for their own benefit. Congress should once
again take the necessary steps to ensure that incumbents cannot throttle
(literally as well as figuratively) the legions of potential competitors trying
to reach willing consumers.
At the same time, Congress should prune away the needless overgrowth
of older rules, like syndicated exclusivity, the sports blackout rule and the
network non-duplication rule, that exist only to protect the business model of
local broadcasting. Senator DeMint and Representative Scalise are on the right
track with their bill that would clear away much of the regulatory underbrush
that holds back the evolution of the video marketplace,[7] although
the bill goes too far by eliminating ownership restrictions still needed to
maintain diversity in traditional media. Some other rules, like retransmission
consent and the compulsory copyright license, are outdated, but part of an
interwoven fabric of regulatory and business expectations. They should be
reformed, but cautiously.
At the same time, measures that are designed to mitigate the market
power of certain large video providers should not be repealed until true
competition develops. In some respects they should be extended. For example,
online video providers that wish to voluntarily operate as “multichannel video programming
distributors” (MVPDs) under Title VI of the Communications Act[8] should be
able to do so, as this would enable them to access certain valuable content and
protect them against anticompetitive actions by incumbents.[9] This would
ensure that consumers had more choices for high-value content than they do
today and would eliminate the incentives that keep certain content from being
licensed widely.
Finally, the fact that the largest residential broadband ISPs, such
as Comcast, are also MVPDs invested in the existing video distribution models
raises concerns. These ISP/MVPDs can impose a variety of policies that prevent
genuinely disruptive competition. For example, the ability to control how much
data subscribers may access through data caps, the ability to privilege some
content over others through prioritization or exemption from data caps, and the
ability to control what devices can connect to the network, give cable
operators (and other broadband providers like FIOS) the ability to pick winners
and losers just as cable operators did from 1984 to 1992.
Detailed Analysis and Recommendations
The video marketplace is unique, not only because of its
complicated business and regulatory structures, but because video incumbents
are better placed to counter the threat the Internet poses to their business
models. They do this in varied and creative ways.
Threats to Internet Openness
For a long time it looked as though ISPs would continue doing
what Comcast did when it started degrading BitTorrent traffic—picking and
choosing which Internet protocols and services got preferential or
discriminatory treatment. But recently ISPs have found that it is more
effective to discriminate via billing practices. Some ISPs have set their
bandwidth caps so low as to make it financially unattractive to switch over entirely
to online video, as this would put viewers over their caps and perhaps subject
them to overage charges.[10]
At the same time, at least one ISP exempts its own video services that are
delivered over the same infrastructure from the caps.[11]
These practices disadvantage services like Netflix and Amazon Instant Video and
relegate most online video to the role of a supplement to, rather than
replacement for, traditional MVPD services.
To counter this, Congress needs to stand behind the FCC’s
attempts to protect Internet openness.[12]
At the same time these protections need to be strengthened, their loopholes
need to be closed, and they need to take into account the fact that that
discrimination can happen through billing, as well as through Internet “fast
lanes” and other forms of technological discrimination.
Restrictions on the Availability of Content
The current regulatory system makes it so that incumbent MVPDs
but not online providers can carry broadcast content,[13]
and it makes it easy for incumbents to share content with each other while
keeping it out of the hands of potential new competitors.[14]
And while it’s unlawful for incumbent providers to behave anti-competitively
towards each other, they are free to keep their content away from online
services, and to use exclusionary contracts and “most favored nation” clauses
to limit the online distribution of independent programming.[15]
As a result, while a lot of very good video programming is
available online, the most popular programming is not.[16]
Popular broadcast and cable channels are not available online. Many popular
shows are not available online at all or are only made available after a
“windowing” period. Some programs are put online reasonably promptly, but are only
viewable in inconvenient ways. Some of the best online content is only
available to viewers who also have cable subscriptions, through TV Everywhere
and similar efforts. Live sports, and especially live local sports, are
generally not available online at all. Thus, while online services make it easy
to watch great documentaries, classic movies, and old sitcoms, the kinds of
culturally-current programming that people talk about at the office and online
are usually not available without a cable or satellite subscription.
This problem would be largely abated if online providers like
Sky Angel were permitted to operate as MVPDs, like they want to.[17]
The rules that ensure that all MVPDs can access certain content would then
protect them as well as incumbents. At the same time, the FCC should find that
the current rules that prohibit incumbents from behaving anti-competitively
toward each other also prohibit them from taking anti-competitive acts against
even those online video providers that choose not to operate as MVPDs.[18]
But even short of that, if more content were available from online services
that might choose to operate as MVPDs, the incentive to keep content offline
would evaporate to the benefit of the entire video marketplace.
The current pay TV MVPD model is very lucrative for some
because it forces viewers to pay for programming they don’t want. Even some
popular programmers like Time Warner, who have no direct stake in the cable
business, find it more profitable to give exclusives to MVPDs than to make
their programming available to willing buyers online.[19]
This is because people pay for large bundles of cable channels, some of which
are very expensive, even if they only want to watch a few.[20]
Every cable subscriber has to pay for broadcast channels, even though they are
available over the air for free. This leads to high prices that just keep
getting higher. The result of all
of this is a loss for consumers.
One quick way to fix this would be to scrap the rules that
require that cable systems carry broadcast stations as part of their basic tier—customers
should be able to choose what they pay for. And while video providers should be
free to bundle content and should not be required to offer everything a la
carte, it seems logical that increased competition from online providers would
force today’s providers to begin offering their customers more flexibility.
Marketplace Consolidation
The merger between Comcast and NBC Universal brought a large
amount of programming under the control of a cable system that has an incentive
to limit its distribution online.[21]
While it is true that both the Department of Justice and the FCC conditioned
their transaction on Comcast’s commitment to make certain programming available
to online distributors,[22]
as Public Knowledge has argued, behavioral remedies are, in general,
insufficient to overcome all the anti-competitive effects of mergers, joint
ventures, and other structural changes that create incentives to limit
distribution and innovation.[23]
Unfortunately, yet another such change has been proposed, whereby Verizon and
several large cable companies plan to create various joint entities to develop
new video technologies and to market each other’s products rather than compete.[24]
In addition to limiting competition in existing markets, these arrangements
could mean that much video in the future will be locked up in proprietary
platforms, and could mean that anticompetitive “authentication” schemes like TV
Everywhere become even more widespread. If policymakers truly wish to safeguard
the future of video, they should prevent these sorts of anticompetitive
agreements from taking place.
Outdated Rules That Protect Incumbent
Business Models
Protectionist Measures
Finally, there are some rules on the books today that seem
designed to prop up legacy business models and have long outlived any functions
they may once have served. Many of them can and should be repealed today.
Examples of these include sports blackout rules, network nonduplication, and
syndicated exclusivity provisions,[25]
and the previously-mentioned rule that requires that all MVPD viewers pay for
free over-the-air television.[26]
Some of these rules were passed to protect aspects of the video distribution
system from disruption before Internet video was a possibility, and when it
seemed that if local broadcasters lost revenue nothing could replace them.
Exclusivity rules not only keep cable systems from carrying signals from
“distant” markets but they prevent networks from distributing content on a
non-exclusive basis. The world these rules were written for is gone now and
they have outlived their purpose. Some local broadcasters never provided unique
local programming, and the various public goals that they provide can be
achieved more effectively through other means. Traditional models of video distribution are still valuable,
and local broadcasters who serve their communities will continue to thrive
after any regulatory reform. But
the broadcasting industry no longer needs extraordinary protection against
changes in technology, business models, and viewer behavior.
Outdated, but Complex Rules
Some other rules are outdated, but so interconnected with
other rules and marketplace expectations that they need to be approached
carefully. Among these are the compulsory copyright license,[27]
retransmission consent,[28]
and must-carry.[29] The
compulsory license cannot be reformed unless video providers are given
assurance that they never have to stop carrying programming just because they
don’t know whom to contact for a license, and to make sure that they can cope
with any potential holdout problems. And it would make no sense to embark on a
comprehensive reform of the laws governing video carriage in a way that
replicated the problems that afflict the retransmission consent process today,
while introducing new ones. Short of dealing with the compulsory license and
retransmission consent together, several reforms could improve the current
retransmission consent process. Many of the rules that have already been
mentioned give an unfair advantage to broadcasters and drive up the rates they
can charge. And some broadcasters have engaged in brinksmanship tactics that
harm viewers, where they pull their signals from MVPDs right before
high-profile events.[30] These
problems can at least be alleviated with meaningful “good faith” standards that
discourage unfair negotiation tactics, and interim carriage requirements that
minimize disruption to viewers.[31]
Finally, while the must-carry system is used by many low-value broadcasters in
ways that Congress never intended, public and non-commercial stations continue
to serve a valuable role and policymakers should find ways to protect the good
that they do.
Policies That Are Still Needed
Still other rules serve a function and should be maintained,
at least until competition develops. These include the program access, program
carriage rules, as well as set-top box competition rules. The program access
rules and related protections prevent any one MVPD from having exclusive rights
to content. Although the video market is not as competitive as it can be in the
Internet age, the fact remains that the American video distribution market is
more competitive than that of many other countries. The program access rules
are to thank for that, and they should be extended to all services that wish to
operate as MVPDs, even ones that are exclusively online. Similarly, the program
carriage system, which protects independent programmers from the negative
effects of bottleneck control by some MVPDs, still serves a role in ensuring
that viewers can enjoy content from diverse sources. Lastly, the directive expressed by Congress under Section
629 to have true set-top box competition has remained largely unfulfilled. Until Internet-delivered video becomes
a true substitution, preserving the FCC’s authority to promote set-top box
competition will remain necessary.
Copyright and Spectrum Policy
There are two
other kinds of regulations that can hold back the development of online video. Policymakers don’t always see them as
“regulations” in the same sense as things like syndicated exclusivity. But
copyright and spectrum laws are regulations nonetheless, and they have profound
effects on the shape of the market.
Copyright law shouldn’t be misused to hold back the evolution
of the video marketplace. Dish is being sued for making a DVR that’s too
sophisticated for the taste of some networks. But it’s not illegal to skip
commercials or for users to take full advantage of their home recording rights.[32]
And Aereo’s remote antenna is legal just as Cablevision’s remote DVR is.[33]
Copyrights are limited monopolies granted by the government, and they come with
a series of limitations and exceptions designed to protect users as well as
creators. They should not be a weapon used to limit experimentation with
business models and services.
Nor should misplaced fears of piracy keep content offline.
Some content industry executives have a view of technology and the Internet
that can only be described as superstitious, and they think that if they give
people access to content they’ll lose control of it. But recent history shows
that most people only turn to piracy when content is not available online
though other means. From the perspective of limiting copyright infringement,
limiting online distribution is simply counterproductive. This is why it is
particularly distressing that recent trade agreements contain language that
could be interpreted as limiting the possibilities of online video distribution.[34]
To whom the government assigns spectrum and for what purpose
it allocates it also has an impact on the video marketplace. As long as
broadcasters use the public airwaves they will have public responsibilities.
For example, they must operate transparently,[35]
they must serve the needs of their communities,[36]
and they cannot behave unreasonably in retransmission negotiations.[37]
While it is true that fewer people rely on over-the-air television today than
they did in its peak, due to the increasing costs of cable, a new generation of
viewers is getting familiar with rabbit ears.[38]
Thus, to say that broadcasting is no longer relevant is just as wrong as to say
that it should remain at the center of the video marketplace. In a more
competitive video marketplace there will no doubt be room for many different
kinds of services. The solution is not to enshrine or attack broadcasting but
to incentivize them to create great content, and to adopt policies that allow
spectrum to be put to other uses. Not only would this be beneficial to
communications policy generally but the impact on the video marketplace would
be profound, as distribution channels adapt to fit a more decentralized and dynamic
marketplace.
Conclusion
As they have in the past policymakers are starting to
consider the implications of increasing change in the market for video
distribution. History provides examples both of protectionist regulations that
should be avoided today, and of pro-competitive measures that serve as more
positive precedents. But today is different in one way: Finally, the technology
exists that could eliminate the physical, bottleneck control of video
distribution that has existed in various forms for decades. If policymakers
take some simple steps to facilitate the development of competitive online
video they can begin to disengage from regulations that were designed to
counter the effects of this bottleneck control. However, if they fail to do
this, it is likely that incumbents will be able to continue to shape the
development of the video market and extend their current dominance
indefinitely. While the Internet provides grounds for hoping that the future of
video will be better for consumers, policymakers have a lot of work to do to
help make that happen.
[1] See United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US 157 (1968). This case, in addition
to being an important case setting out the bounds of FCC authority, contains a
summary of the FCC’s early efforts at cable regulation. See also Office of
Telecommunications Policy, Cable: Report to the President (1974), which
contains an early history of the cable industry and attempts at cable
regulation, as well as policy recommendations.
[2] The 1974
OSTP Report said that “cable is not merely an extension or improvement of
broadcast television. It has the potential to become an important and entirely
new communications medium, open while and available to all.” OSTP Report at 13.
But cable did succeed in providing viewers with more content it fell short of
this early promise, and the regulatory system that developed ensured that cable
extending the reach of broadcasting instead of developing into a competitor to
it.
[3] Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, PL 102-385, 106
Stat. 1460 (1992).
[4] E.g., The
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub.L.
No. 106‑113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A‑526 to 1501A‑545 (Nov. 29, 1999).
[5] See Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, MB
Docket No. 06-189 (rel. Jan 16, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-206A1.pdf.
See also Comments of Public Knowledge
in Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 07-269 (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/PK_Comments_MVPD-Competition-Report.pdf.
[6] For example,
Adelphia’s cable assets were sold to Time Warner Cable and Comcast. See
Adelphia Sold to Time Warner, Comcast, Buffalo
Business First, April 21, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/stories/2005/04/18/daily37.html?page=all.
Comcast’s cable assets and NBC Universal have been combined in a joint venture
that is controlled by, and 51% owned by Comcast. See General Electric, New NBCU, http://www.ge.com/newnbcu.
[7] Next
Generation Television Marketplace Act, H.R. 3675 and S. 2008.
[9] See Comments of Public Knowledge in
Interpretation of the Terms “Multichannel Video Programming Distributor” and
“Channel” as Raised in Pending Program Access Proceeding, MB Docket No. 12-83
(filed May 14, 2012) (Sky Angel Comments), available
at http://www.publicknowledge.org/interpretation-mvpd.
[10] Andrew Odlyzko, Bill St. Arnaud, Erik Stallman,
& Michael Weinberg, Know Your Limits: Considering the Role of Data Caps and
Usage Based Billing in Internet Access Service 48 (Public Knowledge
2012) (“Comcast’s own estimate for the amount of data required to replace its
pay-television offering with an over the top competitor is 288 GB per month. In
light of this, it may come as no surprise that Comcast’s data cap is set at 250
GB per month.”). Comcast has since raised its cap, but it is worth observing
that the 288 GB per month figure is based on an unknown mix of standard and
high-definition content; presumably, a higher percentage of high-definition
video would lead to a higher figure. See
Mark Israel and Michael L. Katz, The
Comcast/NBCU Transaction and Online Video Distribution, Submitted by
Comcast Corporation, MB Docket No. 10-56 (May 4 2010) at 33, available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448237.
[11] Michael
Weinberg, Comcast Exempts Itself From Its
Data Cap, Violates (at least the) Spirit of Net Neutrality, Public Knowledge (March 26, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/comcast-exempts-itself-its-data-cap-violates-.
[12] Preserving
the Open Internet, Report & Order,
GN Docket No. 09-191, FCC 10-201, available
at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.pdf.
[13] 47 U.S.C. §
325; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64.
[14] 47 U.S.C. §
548. See Revision of the Commission’s
Program Access Rules, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 12-68, FCC 12-30 (rel. Mar. 20, 2012) for an
overview of the program access rules.
[15] Jon
Brodkin, DOJ probing Big Cable Over Online Video Competition, Ars
Technica, June 13, 2012 (noting that “[t]he DOJ is also investigating
contracts programmers sign to be distributed on cable systems, which include ‘most-favored
nation clauses’ that may favor cable companies over online video
distributors.”)
[16] See Carlos Kirjner, Internet TV (or Why
It Is So Hard to Go Over the Top), Bernstein Research (June 15, 2012).
[17] See Sky Angel Comments.
[18] As Public
Knowledge has argued,
The [FCC] should use its
authority over the video programming distribution market to protect online
video distribution generally, by prohibiting MVPDs from behaving
anticompetitively in ways that harm any video distributor, whether or not it is
an MVPD. Section 628 of the Communications Act provides authority for this.
This Section bans any actions “the purpose or effect of which is to hinder
significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor from
providing ... programming to subscribers or consumers.”The
close connection between the markets for MVPD and non-MVPD video distribution
mean that anticompetitive actions taken against an non-MVPD would likely have a
deleterious effect on the ability of a competitive MVPD to offer programming—for
example, by increasing its costs, or inhibiting the ability of an MVPD to offer
programming on demand or online.
Sky Angel Comments at 24-25.
[19] Brian
Stelter, HBO Says No, for Now, to Fans
Who Want a Web-Only Option, NY Times
Media Decoder, June 6, 2012, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/hbo-says-no-for-now-to-fans-who-want-a-web-only-option.
[20] Peter
Kafka, Hate Paying for Cable? Here’s Why,
AllThingsD, March 10, 2010, http://allthingsd.com/20100308/hate-paying-for-cable-heres-the-reason-why.
[21] Competitive
Impact Statement of the Department of Justice at 4, United States v. Comcast
Corp., 1:11-cv-00106, (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf
[22]
Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc., for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of
Licenses, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238 (2011); Final
Judgment in United States v. Comcast, United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Case No. 1:II-cv-00l06 (Sept. 1, 2011).
[23] Petition to
Deny of Public Knowledge and Future of Music Coalition in WT Docket No. 11-65
(filed May 31, 2011), at 62-70, available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/pk_fmc-att_tmo-petition_to_deny.pdf.
[24] See Petition to Deny of Public Knowledge
et al. in WT Docket No. 12-4 (filed Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/pk_verizon_spectrumco_petition.pdf.
[25] 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.92(f), 76.106(a), 76.111, 76.120, and 76.127-130.
[26] 47 C.F.R. §
76.901(a) ("The basic service tier shall, at a minimum, include all
signals of domestic television broadcast stations provided to any
subscriber"); 47 C.F.R. § 76.920 ("Every subscriber of a cable system
must subscribe to the basic tier in order to subscribe to any other tier of
video programming or to purchase any other video programming.").
[28] 47
U.S.C. § 325; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64.
[29] 47 U.S.C. § 534; 47 C.F.R. § 76.55.
[30] Amendment
of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
26 FCC Rcd. 2718, ¶15 (2011).
[31] See Comments of Public Knowledge and New
America Foundation in MB Docket No. 10-71 (filed May 27, 2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/11-05-27PK-NAF_retrans_comments.pdf.
[32] See John Bergmayer, Networks Pull the Trigger on Dish, but They're Only Hurting Themselves,
Public Knowledge (May 25, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/networks-pull-trigger-against-dish-theyre-onl.
[33] See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic
Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge in WNET
v. Aereo, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Case No. 1:12-cv-01543-AJN, available
at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/aereo_amici_brief.pdf.
[34] Many free
trade agreements appear to state that online retransmission may not occur
without the permission both of the owner of the copyright in the programming,
and of the broadcaster. This is at odds with the current system of a compulsory
license plus retransmission consent, which requires MVPDs to obtain the
permission only of the signal owner, not of the content owners. Some current
reform proposals involve requiring an MVPD to obtain the permission of the
copyright holders instead of the permission of the broadcaster, but not of
both. See John Bergmayer, The US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Policy
Laundering in Action, Public
Knowledge (April 20, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/us-colombia-laundering.
But see Comments of ABC, CBS, and NBC
Television Affiliates in MB Docket No. 12-83 (filed June 13, 2012), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021922660
(arguing that it would be consistent with the agreements if online systems were
categorized as MVPDs and subsequently followed standard retransmission consent
procedures).
[35] See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (public file
requirement).
[36] 47 C.F.R. §
73.3526(e)(11)(i).
[37] 47 U.S.C.
§§ 325(b)(3)(C)(ii), (iii).
[38] Christopher
S. Stewart, Over-the-Air TV Catches
Second Wind, Aided by the Web, Wall
Street Journal (Feb. 21, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204059804577229451364593094.html
(“It's cool to have rabbit ears again.”).
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[#children] => President and CEO Gigi Sohn's oral testimony is available as a PDF here. The written testimony, available below, is also available as a PDF here.
Testimony of Gigi B. Sohn
President, Public Knowledge
Before the
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and
Commerce
Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology
Hearing On:
“The Future of Video”
Washington, DC
June 27, 2012
Chairman Walden, Ranking Member Eshoo, members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to talk about the future of
video. My name is Gigi Sohn, and I
am President of Public Knowledge, a non-profit public interest organization
that seeks to ensure that the public benefits from a communications system that
is open, competitive and affordable.
Introduction
There is widespread agreement that we are currently living in the
golden age of television. Programs
like Mad Men, Breaking Bad, Game of Thrones,
Modern Family, The Daily Show and The
Colbert Report have become part of our cultural landscape, and even in this
era of 500 channels, still inspire discussions around the water cooler. There are numerous new ways to
watch TV – be it on a flat screen LED television, on a tablet or on a
smartphone. And the Internet
and DVRs have the ability to allow a viewer to watch what they want to watch
when they want to watch it.
Despite all of the great programming and groundbreaking devices,
Americans are locked into a television business model that limits competition
and choice; keeps prices for video high and limits technology and online video
from achieving their full potential.
This business model is made possible largely by an outdated regulatory
structure created by incumbents to gain competitive advantage. It is time for Congress and the
FCC to revamp this regulatory structure so that new video competition can
thrive – giving consumers greater options and the ability to watch video
whenever they want and on the device of their choosing.
Congress and the FCC can achieve this goal in three ways. First,
they can clear away some of the outdated rules that slow down the evolution of
the video marketplace. Second, they can extend the successful policies that
allow competitors to access high-value content to certain online providers.
Third, they can protect Internet openness and prevent discriminatory billing
practices that hold back online video. By doing this they will increase
competition, which will mean lower prices, better services, and more
flexibility and control for consumers.
Background
For nearly a century the federal government has shaped the
development of electronic media. In the 1920s the Federal Radio Commission
brought order to the chaotic and experimental landscape that characterized
early broadcasting. In doing so it set the conditions that allowed radio and
then television broadcasting to develop into what it was in its heyday, and
what it is today. In the 1960s and 1970s the FCC took steps to protect
broadcasting from the disorganized and innovative early cable industry.[1] By doing
this it made sure that cable became an adjunct to rather than a replacement for
established broadcasting.[2]
After Congress passed the Cable Act of 1984, the tables turned and
cable became the monopoly. Cable operators controlled who did and didn’t get on
the new medium, using their power to require cable programmers, such as the
fledgling CNN and Discovery, to provide “pay for play” equity interests to
cable operators, or sign exclusive agreements prohibiting programmers like MTV
from appearing on potential competitors such as Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS). At the same time, cable operators received access to needed inputs such
as poll attachment rights and broadcast programming. The lack of competition
led to high prices and poor service, but the cable incumbents’ control over
“must have” programming made it impossible for any competing services to
emerge.
It was not until the 1992 Cable Act[3] that
Congress embarked on an express policy of increasing competition in the television
market. It realized that potential competitors needed access to the same
content as large cable systems with market power. New laws such as program access rules that gave competitors
access to programming owned by the cable operators, and program carriage rules
that prevented cable operators from demanding an equity share as a condition of
carriage (”pay for play”), helped make it possible for new “multi-channel video
programming” providers (MVPDs) to compete with cable operators, as did changes
to the law to make it easier for competitors to get access to broadcast programming.[4] These policies of increasing
competition were somewhat successful but their promise was not entirely fulfilled.[5] They
enabled some new competitors to operate but these new competitors did not
change the fundamental shape of the market. They did not slow the increasing
power of cable generally and a few large cable companies in particular.[6] And they
did little or nothing to keep the market from consolidating in ways detrimental
to consumers and independent content producers alike.
The Internet is changing the video marketplace just as it changed
the market for music, news, books, and other forms of media. But it’s not a
foregone conclusion that the Internet will disrupt
the video marketplace. Dominant players in the market today have control both
over the content their nascent online competitors need for their service, and
over the pipes they must use to reach consumers. As a result much high-value
programming is not available online, and online video providers have to contend
with artificially low bandwidth caps and other discriminatory practices that
keep them from reaching their full potential.
Thus while it’s inevitable that IP technologies and the Internet
will play an ever-larger part of video delivery, it remains an open question
whether consumers or incumbents with market power will enjoy the lion’s share
of the benefits. Consumers will still suffer from a lack of choice and
independent content producers will still struggle to reach viewers if existing
incumbents in the content and the MVPD industry continue to thwart disruptive
change and manage the transition for their own benefit. Congress should once
again take the necessary steps to ensure that incumbents cannot throttle
(literally as well as figuratively) the legions of potential competitors trying
to reach willing consumers.
At the same time, Congress should prune away the needless overgrowth
of older rules, like syndicated exclusivity, the sports blackout rule and the
network non-duplication rule, that exist only to protect the business model of
local broadcasting. Senator DeMint and Representative Scalise are on the right
track with their bill that would clear away much of the regulatory underbrush
that holds back the evolution of the video marketplace,[7] although
the bill goes too far by eliminating ownership restrictions still needed to
maintain diversity in traditional media. Some other rules, like retransmission
consent and the compulsory copyright license, are outdated, but part of an
interwoven fabric of regulatory and business expectations. They should be
reformed, but cautiously.
At the same time, measures that are designed to mitigate the market
power of certain large video providers should not be repealed until true
competition develops. In some respects they should be extended. For example,
online video providers that wish to voluntarily operate as “multichannel video programming
distributors” (MVPDs) under Title VI of the Communications Act[8] should be
able to do so, as this would enable them to access certain valuable content and
protect them against anticompetitive actions by incumbents.[9] This would
ensure that consumers had more choices for high-value content than they do
today and would eliminate the incentives that keep certain content from being
licensed widely.
Finally, the fact that the largest residential broadband ISPs, such
as Comcast, are also MVPDs invested in the existing video distribution models
raises concerns. These ISP/MVPDs can impose a variety of policies that prevent
genuinely disruptive competition. For example, the ability to control how much
data subscribers may access through data caps, the ability to privilege some
content over others through prioritization or exemption from data caps, and the
ability to control what devices can connect to the network, give cable
operators (and other broadband providers like FIOS) the ability to pick winners
and losers just as cable operators did from 1984 to 1992.
Detailed Analysis and Recommendations
The video marketplace is unique, not only because of its
complicated business and regulatory structures, but because video incumbents
are better placed to counter the threat the Internet poses to their business
models. They do this in varied and creative ways.
Threats to Internet Openness
For a long time it looked as though ISPs would continue doing
what Comcast did when it started degrading BitTorrent traffic—picking and
choosing which Internet protocols and services got preferential or
discriminatory treatment. But recently ISPs have found that it is more
effective to discriminate via billing practices. Some ISPs have set their
bandwidth caps so low as to make it financially unattractive to switch over entirely
to online video, as this would put viewers over their caps and perhaps subject
them to overage charges.[10]
At the same time, at least one ISP exempts its own video services that are
delivered over the same infrastructure from the caps.[11]
These practices disadvantage services like Netflix and Amazon Instant Video and
relegate most online video to the role of a supplement to, rather than
replacement for, traditional MVPD services.
To counter this, Congress needs to stand behind the FCC’s
attempts to protect Internet openness.[12]
At the same time these protections need to be strengthened, their loopholes
need to be closed, and they need to take into account the fact that that
discrimination can happen through billing, as well as through Internet “fast
lanes” and other forms of technological discrimination.
Restrictions on the Availability of Content
The current regulatory system makes it so that incumbent MVPDs
but not online providers can carry broadcast content,[13]
and it makes it easy for incumbents to share content with each other while
keeping it out of the hands of potential new competitors.[14]
And while it’s unlawful for incumbent providers to behave anti-competitively
towards each other, they are free to keep their content away from online
services, and to use exclusionary contracts and “most favored nation” clauses
to limit the online distribution of independent programming.[15]
As a result, while a lot of very good video programming is
available online, the most popular programming is not.[16]
Popular broadcast and cable channels are not available online. Many popular
shows are not available online at all or are only made available after a
“windowing” period. Some programs are put online reasonably promptly, but are only
viewable in inconvenient ways. Some of the best online content is only
available to viewers who also have cable subscriptions, through TV Everywhere
and similar efforts. Live sports, and especially live local sports, are
generally not available online at all. Thus, while online services make it easy
to watch great documentaries, classic movies, and old sitcoms, the kinds of
culturally-current programming that people talk about at the office and online
are usually not available without a cable or satellite subscription.
This problem would be largely abated if online providers like
Sky Angel were permitted to operate as MVPDs, like they want to.[17]
The rules that ensure that all MVPDs can access certain content would then
protect them as well as incumbents. At the same time, the FCC should find that
the current rules that prohibit incumbents from behaving anti-competitively
toward each other also prohibit them from taking anti-competitive acts against
even those online video providers that choose not to operate as MVPDs.[18]
But even short of that, if more content were available from online services
that might choose to operate as MVPDs, the incentive to keep content offline
would evaporate to the benefit of the entire video marketplace.
The current pay TV MVPD model is very lucrative for some
because it forces viewers to pay for programming they don’t want. Even some
popular programmers like Time Warner, who have no direct stake in the cable
business, find it more profitable to give exclusives to MVPDs than to make
their programming available to willing buyers online.[19]
This is because people pay for large bundles of cable channels, some of which
are very expensive, even if they only want to watch a few.[20]
Every cable subscriber has to pay for broadcast channels, even though they are
available over the air for free. This leads to high prices that just keep
getting higher. The result of all
of this is a loss for consumers.
One quick way to fix this would be to scrap the rules that
require that cable systems carry broadcast stations as part of their basic tier—customers
should be able to choose what they pay for. And while video providers should be
free to bundle content and should not be required to offer everything a la
carte, it seems logical that increased competition from online providers would
force today’s providers to begin offering their customers more flexibility.
Marketplace Consolidation
The merger between Comcast and NBC Universal brought a large
amount of programming under the control of a cable system that has an incentive
to limit its distribution online.[21]
While it is true that both the Department of Justice and the FCC conditioned
their transaction on Comcast’s commitment to make certain programming available
to online distributors,[22]
as Public Knowledge has argued, behavioral remedies are, in general,
insufficient to overcome all the anti-competitive effects of mergers, joint
ventures, and other structural changes that create incentives to limit
distribution and innovation.[23]
Unfortunately, yet another such change has been proposed, whereby Verizon and
several large cable companies plan to create various joint entities to develop
new video technologies and to market each other’s products rather than compete.[24]
In addition to limiting competition in existing markets, these arrangements
could mean that much video in the future will be locked up in proprietary
platforms, and could mean that anticompetitive “authentication” schemes like TV
Everywhere become even more widespread. If policymakers truly wish to safeguard
the future of video, they should prevent these sorts of anticompetitive
agreements from taking place.
Outdated Rules That Protect Incumbent
Business Models
Protectionist Measures
Finally, there are some rules on the books today that seem
designed to prop up legacy business models and have long outlived any functions
they may once have served. Many of them can and should be repealed today.
Examples of these include sports blackout rules, network nonduplication, and
syndicated exclusivity provisions,[25]
and the previously-mentioned rule that requires that all MVPD viewers pay for
free over-the-air television.[26]
Some of these rules were passed to protect aspects of the video distribution
system from disruption before Internet video was a possibility, and when it
seemed that if local broadcasters lost revenue nothing could replace them.
Exclusivity rules not only keep cable systems from carrying signals from
“distant” markets but they prevent networks from distributing content on a
non-exclusive basis. The world these rules were written for is gone now and
they have outlived their purpose. Some local broadcasters never provided unique
local programming, and the various public goals that they provide can be
achieved more effectively through other means. Traditional models of video distribution are still valuable,
and local broadcasters who serve their communities will continue to thrive
after any regulatory reform. But
the broadcasting industry no longer needs extraordinary protection against
changes in technology, business models, and viewer behavior.
Outdated, but Complex Rules
Some other rules are outdated, but so interconnected with
other rules and marketplace expectations that they need to be approached
carefully. Among these are the compulsory copyright license,[27]
retransmission consent,[28]
and must-carry.[29] The
compulsory license cannot be reformed unless video providers are given
assurance that they never have to stop carrying programming just because they
don’t know whom to contact for a license, and to make sure that they can cope
with any potential holdout problems. And it would make no sense to embark on a
comprehensive reform of the laws governing video carriage in a way that
replicated the problems that afflict the retransmission consent process today,
while introducing new ones. Short of dealing with the compulsory license and
retransmission consent together, several reforms could improve the current
retransmission consent process. Many of the rules that have already been
mentioned give an unfair advantage to broadcasters and drive up the rates they
can charge. And some broadcasters have engaged in brinksmanship tactics that
harm viewers, where they pull their signals from MVPDs right before
high-profile events.[30] These
problems can at least be alleviated with meaningful “good faith” standards that
discourage unfair negotiation tactics, and interim carriage requirements that
minimize disruption to viewers.[31]
Finally, while the must-carry system is used by many low-value broadcasters in
ways that Congress never intended, public and non-commercial stations continue
to serve a valuable role and policymakers should find ways to protect the good
that they do.
Policies That Are Still Needed
Still other rules serve a function and should be maintained,
at least until competition develops. These include the program access, program
carriage rules, as well as set-top box competition rules. The program access
rules and related protections prevent any one MVPD from having exclusive rights
to content. Although the video market is not as competitive as it can be in the
Internet age, the fact remains that the American video distribution market is
more competitive than that of many other countries. The program access rules
are to thank for that, and they should be extended to all services that wish to
operate as MVPDs, even ones that are exclusively online. Similarly, the program
carriage system, which protects independent programmers from the negative
effects of bottleneck control by some MVPDs, still serves a role in ensuring
that viewers can enjoy content from diverse sources. Lastly, the directive expressed by Congress under Section
629 to have true set-top box competition has remained largely unfulfilled. Until Internet-delivered video becomes
a true substitution, preserving the FCC’s authority to promote set-top box
competition will remain necessary.
Copyright and Spectrum Policy
There are two
other kinds of regulations that can hold back the development of online video. Policymakers don’t always see them as
“regulations” in the same sense as things like syndicated exclusivity. But
copyright and spectrum laws are regulations nonetheless, and they have profound
effects on the shape of the market.
Copyright law shouldn’t be misused to hold back the evolution
of the video marketplace. Dish is being sued for making a DVR that’s too
sophisticated for the taste of some networks. But it’s not illegal to skip
commercials or for users to take full advantage of their home recording rights.[32]
And Aereo’s remote antenna is legal just as Cablevision’s remote DVR is.[33]
Copyrights are limited monopolies granted by the government, and they come with
a series of limitations and exceptions designed to protect users as well as
creators. They should not be a weapon used to limit experimentation with
business models and services.
Nor should misplaced fears of piracy keep content offline.
Some content industry executives have a view of technology and the Internet
that can only be described as superstitious, and they think that if they give
people access to content they’ll lose control of it. But recent history shows
that most people only turn to piracy when content is not available online
though other means. From the perspective of limiting copyright infringement,
limiting online distribution is simply counterproductive. This is why it is
particularly distressing that recent trade agreements contain language that
could be interpreted as limiting the possibilities of online video distribution.[34]
To whom the government assigns spectrum and for what purpose
it allocates it also has an impact on the video marketplace. As long as
broadcasters use the public airwaves they will have public responsibilities.
For example, they must operate transparently,[35]
they must serve the needs of their communities,[36]
and they cannot behave unreasonably in retransmission negotiations.[37]
While it is true that fewer people rely on over-the-air television today than
they did in its peak, due to the increasing costs of cable, a new generation of
viewers is getting familiar with rabbit ears.[38]
Thus, to say that broadcasting is no longer relevant is just as wrong as to say
that it should remain at the center of the video marketplace. In a more
competitive video marketplace there will no doubt be room for many different
kinds of services. The solution is not to enshrine or attack broadcasting but
to incentivize them to create great content, and to adopt policies that allow
spectrum to be put to other uses. Not only would this be beneficial to
communications policy generally but the impact on the video marketplace would
be profound, as distribution channels adapt to fit a more decentralized and dynamic
marketplace.
Conclusion
As they have in the past policymakers are starting to
consider the implications of increasing change in the market for video
distribution. History provides examples both of protectionist regulations that
should be avoided today, and of pro-competitive measures that serve as more
positive precedents. But today is different in one way: Finally, the technology
exists that could eliminate the physical, bottleneck control of video
distribution that has existed in various forms for decades. If policymakers
take some simple steps to facilitate the development of competitive online
video they can begin to disengage from regulations that were designed to
counter the effects of this bottleneck control. However, if they fail to do
this, it is likely that incumbents will be able to continue to shape the
development of the video market and extend their current dominance
indefinitely. While the Internet provides grounds for hoping that the future of
video will be better for consumers, policymakers have a lot of work to do to
help make that happen.
[1] See United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US 157 (1968). This case, in addition
to being an important case setting out the bounds of FCC authority, contains a
summary of the FCC’s early efforts at cable regulation. See also Office of
Telecommunications Policy, Cable: Report to the President (1974), which
contains an early history of the cable industry and attempts at cable
regulation, as well as policy recommendations.
[2] The 1974
OSTP Report said that “cable is not merely an extension or improvement of
broadcast television. It has the potential to become an important and entirely
new communications medium, open while and available to all.” OSTP Report at 13.
But cable did succeed in providing viewers with more content it fell short of
this early promise, and the regulatory system that developed ensured that cable
extending the reach of broadcasting instead of developing into a competitor to
it.
[3] Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, PL 102-385, 106
Stat. 1460 (1992).
[4] E.g., The
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub.L.
No. 106‑113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A‑526 to 1501A‑545 (Nov. 29, 1999).
[5] See Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, MB
Docket No. 06-189 (rel. Jan 16, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-206A1.pdf.
See also Comments of Public Knowledge
in Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 07-269 (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/PK_Comments_MVPD-Competition-Report.pdf.
[6] For example,
Adelphia’s cable assets were sold to Time Warner Cable and Comcast. See
Adelphia Sold to Time Warner, Comcast, Buffalo
Business First, April 21, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/stories/2005/04/18/daily37.html?page=all.
Comcast’s cable assets and NBC Universal have been combined in a joint venture
that is controlled by, and 51% owned by Comcast. See General Electric, New NBCU, http://www.ge.com/newnbcu.
[7] Next
Generation Television Marketplace Act, H.R. 3675 and S. 2008.
[9] See Comments of Public Knowledge in
Interpretation of the Terms “Multichannel Video Programming Distributor” and
“Channel” as Raised in Pending Program Access Proceeding, MB Docket No. 12-83
(filed May 14, 2012) (Sky Angel Comments), available
at http://www.publicknowledge.org/interpretation-mvpd.
[10] Andrew Odlyzko, Bill St. Arnaud, Erik Stallman,
& Michael Weinberg, Know Your Limits: Considering the Role of Data Caps and
Usage Based Billing in Internet Access Service 48 (Public Knowledge
2012) (“Comcast’s own estimate for the amount of data required to replace its
pay-television offering with an over the top competitor is 288 GB per month. In
light of this, it may come as no surprise that Comcast’s data cap is set at 250
GB per month.”). Comcast has since raised its cap, but it is worth observing
that the 288 GB per month figure is based on an unknown mix of standard and
high-definition content; presumably, a higher percentage of high-definition
video would lead to a higher figure. See
Mark Israel and Michael L. Katz, The
Comcast/NBCU Transaction and Online Video Distribution, Submitted by
Comcast Corporation, MB Docket No. 10-56 (May 4 2010) at 33, available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020448237.
[11] Michael
Weinberg, Comcast Exempts Itself From Its
Data Cap, Violates (at least the) Spirit of Net Neutrality, Public Knowledge (March 26, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/comcast-exempts-itself-its-data-cap-violates-.
[12] Preserving
the Open Internet, Report & Order,
GN Docket No. 09-191, FCC 10-201, available
at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.pdf.
[13] 47 U.S.C. §
325; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64.
[14] 47 U.S.C. §
548. See Revision of the Commission’s
Program Access Rules, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 12-68, FCC 12-30 (rel. Mar. 20, 2012) for an
overview of the program access rules.
[15] Jon
Brodkin, DOJ probing Big Cable Over Online Video Competition, Ars
Technica, June 13, 2012 (noting that “[t]he DOJ is also investigating
contracts programmers sign to be distributed on cable systems, which include ‘most-favored
nation clauses’ that may favor cable companies over online video
distributors.”)
[16] See Carlos Kirjner, Internet TV (or Why
It Is So Hard to Go Over the Top), Bernstein Research (June 15, 2012).
[17] See Sky Angel Comments.
[18] As Public
Knowledge has argued,
The [FCC] should use its
authority over the video programming distribution market to protect online
video distribution generally, by prohibiting MVPDs from behaving
anticompetitively in ways that harm any video distributor, whether or not it is
an MVPD. Section 628 of the Communications Act provides authority for this.
This Section bans any actions “the purpose or effect of which is to hinder
significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor from
providing ... programming to subscribers or consumers.”The
close connection between the markets for MVPD and non-MVPD video distribution
mean that anticompetitive actions taken against an non-MVPD would likely have a
deleterious effect on the ability of a competitive MVPD to offer programming—for
example, by increasing its costs, or inhibiting the ability of an MVPD to offer
programming on demand or online.
Sky Angel Comments at 24-25.
[19] Brian
Stelter, HBO Says No, for Now, to Fans
Who Want a Web-Only Option, NY Times
Media Decoder, June 6, 2012, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/hbo-says-no-for-now-to-fans-who-want-a-web-only-option.
[20] Peter
Kafka, Hate Paying for Cable? Here’s Why,
AllThingsD, March 10, 2010, http://allthingsd.com/20100308/hate-paying-for-cable-heres-the-reason-why.
[21] Competitive
Impact Statement of the Department of Justice at 4, United States v. Comcast
Corp., 1:11-cv-00106, (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf
[22]
Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc., for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of
Licenses, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238 (2011); Final
Judgment in United States v. Comcast, United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, Case No. 1:II-cv-00l06 (Sept. 1, 2011).
[23] Petition to
Deny of Public Knowledge and Future of Music Coalition in WT Docket No. 11-65
(filed May 31, 2011), at 62-70, available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/pk_fmc-att_tmo-petition_to_deny.pdf.
[24] See Petition to Deny of Public Knowledge
et al. in WT Docket No. 12-4 (filed Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/pk_verizon_spectrumco_petition.pdf.
[25] 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.92(f), 76.106(a), 76.111, 76.120, and 76.127-130.
[26] 47 C.F.R. §
76.901(a) ("The basic service tier shall, at a minimum, include all
signals of domestic television broadcast stations provided to any
subscriber"); 47 C.F.R. § 76.920 ("Every subscriber of a cable system
must subscribe to the basic tier in order to subscribe to any other tier of
video programming or to purchase any other video programming.").
[28] 47
U.S.C. § 325; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64.
[29] 47 U.S.C. § 534; 47 C.F.R. § 76.55.
[30] Amendment
of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
26 FCC Rcd. 2718, ¶15 (2011).
[31] See Comments of Public Knowledge and New
America Foundation in MB Docket No. 10-71 (filed May 27, 2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/11-05-27PK-NAF_retrans_comments.pdf.
[32] See John Bergmayer, Networks Pull the Trigger on Dish, but They're Only Hurting Themselves,
Public Knowledge (May 25, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/networks-pull-trigger-against-dish-theyre-onl.
[33] See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic
Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge in WNET
v. Aereo, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Case No. 1:12-cv-01543-AJN, available
at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/aereo_amici_brief.pdf.
[34] Many free
trade agreements appear to state that online retransmission may not occur
without the permission both of the owner of the copyright in the programming,
and of the broadcaster. This is at odds with the current system of a compulsory
license plus retransmission consent, which requires MVPDs to obtain the
permission only of the signal owner, not of the content owners. Some current
reform proposals involve requiring an MVPD to obtain the permission of the
copyright holders instead of the permission of the broadcaster, but not of
both. See John Bergmayer, The US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Policy
Laundering in Action, Public
Knowledge (April 20, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/us-colombia-laundering.
But see Comments of ABC, CBS, and NBC
Television Affiliates in MB Docket No. 12-83 (filed June 13, 2012), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021922660
(arguing that it would be consistent with the agreements if online systems were
categorized as MVPDs and subsequently followed standard retransmission consent
procedures).
[35] See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (public file
requirement).
[36] 47 C.F.R. §
73.3526(e)(11)(i).
[37] 47 U.S.C.
§§ 325(b)(3)(C)(ii), (iii).
[38] Christopher
S. Stewart, Over-the-Air TV Catches
Second Wind, Aided by the Web, Wall
Street Journal (Feb. 21, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204059804577229451364593094.html
(“It's cool to have rabbit ears again.”).
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