The evidentiary hearings for the U.S. v. Google (2020) search trial have wrapped up. The Department of Justice’s witnesses to support their proposed final judgement were strong and research-oriented. Meanwhile, Google’s approach to the hearings has largely been defensive – the company spent a significant period of time impeaching the government’s witnesses, meaning Google attempted to undermine the credibility and veracity of witness statements. Given that the requested remedies range from a divestiture of Google’s Chrome browser and possible divestiture of the Android operating system to a prohibition of million-dollar default search payments, it makes sense that Google would take this aggressive approach. Google CEO Sundar Pichai himself asserted that the requested remedies would essentially “spin off search,” an outcome Google insists is bad for the online search ecosystem.
Now I know, I know that it’s true
Don’t say that this is the end
Instead of breaking up I wish that we were making up again
Breaking Up is Hard to Do, Neil Sadaka (1962)
Much like Neil Sadaka croons in the timeless classic, “Breaking Up is Hard to Do,” Google certainly wishes that it could “make up again,” or rather, maintain the structural integrity of its business lines. Per Google’s account, Judge Amit Mehta’s decision centered on contractual agreements, and demands for a break-up stretch far beyond the ruling of the case. But Google is wrong here; the very ability to craft default contracts and restrictive distribution agreements that entrench Google as the only option for online search stems from the company’s dominant market power.
The courtroom saw a parade of economists, regulators, and executives during the evidentiary hearings, each painting a different picture of what “remedy” should actually mean in a case like this. The DOJ (and the states) emphasized just how entrenched Google’s dominance is, not just in search, but in the surrounding ad markets that bankroll it. Their argument was simple: Unless something breaks, nothing will change. That “something” might need to be Google itself.
One of the DOJ’s lead economists likened Google’s structure to a self-reinforcing loop. More data powers better search. Better search draws more users. More users attract more advertisers. The loop keeps spinning, locking out competitors before they even get a chance. Witnesses underscored how this dynamic stifles rivals across verticals like travel, shopping, and local search. In their view, only structural separation, meaning spinning off parts of Google’s business, can restore meaningful competition. Behavioral rules alone will not suffice, especially when Google can afford to treat fines and compliance as just another line item in its budget. Google’s position is that integration makes the product better and that breaking it apart would hurt innovation, confuse consumers, and, most dramatically, degrade the search experience.
Still, some of the most revealing moments came under cross-examination. Government lawyers unearthed internal documents and strategy discussions that undermined Google’s narrative. One former executive admitted that internal placement decisions, such as ranking Google’s own services above competitors’ services, were not always driven by user needs. State attorneys general also highlighted how Google’s dominance in mobile and voice search could easily extend into emerging technology if left unchecked.
From Public Knowledge’s view, that remedy should encapsulate both structural and behavioral remedies, along with long-term oversight measures. This means spinning off both the Android OS and Chrome browser to prevent Google from leveraging its dominance across digital markets; opening up critical data to qualified competitors and advertisers by preventing exclusionary contracts; and implementing strong oversight mechanisms like a technical committee and reporting requirements.
Judge Mehta faces a stark choice. He could make minor adjustments to Google’s business structure that preserve the status quo, or he could order structural change that would fundamentally reshape how the biggest online gatekeeper operates in the digital ecosystem. Google is betting on the former. Public Knowledge, and the public interest, request the latter. Here’s the long and short of it: liability in this case was found because of Google’s propensity to abuse its power not only in the search market, but also the search text advertising market. If Judge Mehta doesn’t want to adjudicate another years-long antitrust case from Google in the near future, he needs to decide on a remedy that rebalances the scales of power online and facilitates consumer choice.
Addressing Google’s monopolistic practices requires a multifaceted remedy strategy that combines structural changes with behavioral regulations. Implementing these recommendations will not only curb anticompetitive conduct but also pave the way for a more open and competitive digital marketplace, ultimately benefiting consumers and the broader economy.