How DOJ’s Proposed Ad Tech Remedies Could Do What the Court Would Not in Online Search

Effectively addressing monopolies means addressing the mechanisms that keep them in place.

Recently, the Department of Justice dropped its final remedies proposal in the Google Ad Tech case, in which Judge Leonie Brinkema of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that Google violated antitrust law by unlawfully maintaining monopolies in the ad tech stack. This decision confirmed how Google controls the tools advertisers use to buy ads, the publisher servers that sell ad space, and the exchange that sits between them. That structure allows Google to tilt the rules of the market in its own favor at every step. Now DOJ and a coalition of states have proposed how to fix it, outlining sweeping remedies that include structural divestitures, open-source auction logic, and long-term oversight. Should Judge Brinkema implement the government proposals, it could address Google’s anticompetitive conduct where the search remedies cannot.

We’ve previously written about how the search and ad tech cases together could reshape the digital marketplace. This writing was preceded by Judge Amit Mehta’s liability decision in the search case, where he confirmed what many of us already knew: Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by abusing its dominance in general search and search text advertising. That ruling was a landmark. But when it came time to craft search remedies, the court blinked.

To recap, Judge Mehta declined to implement several necessary remedies, but most notably refrained from taking on Google’s core exclusionary lever: default payments. On this, Judge Mehta centered his rationale on the idea that enjoining these payments would have a negative impact on downstream partners in adjacent markets. But this rationale was misguided; the impact of a remedy for illegal conduct on partners has not historically been a justification for not implementing it. By leaving default payments untouched, the court left in place the single most powerful mechanism that entrenches Google’s dominance. This is why Mehta’s remedies are disappointing: they somewhat addressed contractual exclusivity, but not the structural or financial strategies that ensure Google remains the unavoidable gatekeeper of search. 

In light of this erroneous rationale, the combined remedies for the search case and the ad tech case will likely not have the market impact we hoped for. But, should Judge Brinkema implement DOJ’s ad tech proposal in full, the consumer experience online may still benefit greatly. The world’s eyes now turn to Judge Brinkema: What remedies will she order? And on what basis?

DOJ’s Bold Proposal in Ad Tech

The ad tech case is different from the search case, but it involves the same underlying strategy: Google leveraging control over key distribution channels to lock out rivals. In ad tech, that meant Google controlled the publisher ad server (DFP), the advertiser tools, and the exchange in between (AdX). By sitting on all sides of the market, Google set the rules and profited at every step.

Judge Mehta’s caution in search stands in stark contrast to the remedies the government proposed in the Google ad tech case. DOJ and the states filed a proposed final judgment that, if adopted by Judge Brinkema, could deliver the kind of structural relief we have long argued is necessary to restore competition in digital advertising.

DOJ’s proposed remedies strike directly at conflict of interests:

  • Structural relief: Google would be required to divest AdX, its ad exchange, to an independent buyer approved by the court. If that proves insufficient, Google would also be required to divest DFP, its publisher ad server. This mirrors the classic antitrust remedy of breaking apart vertically integrated businesses when their structure itself creates the conditions for exclusion.
  • Transparency and interoperability: Google would have to open-source its ad auction’s algorithm so rivals can see and trust how bids are handled. It would also have to provide interoperability APIs, ensuring that competing ad servers and exchanges can plug into the system on fair terms.
  • Oversight and accountability: A divestiture and compliance monitor, and a ten-year oversight period would ensure Google cannot quietly reestablish its dominance. The remedies also include disgorgement of some profits gained through unlawful conduct.

These are neither half-measures or over-reaching. They go to the heart of the structural problem in ad tech: no company should both run the auction and bid in it. Now, the remedies could be strengthened. As we argued in an August letter to DOJ, the remedies could impose clear deadlines for the phased divestiture of Google’s publisher ad server, DFP, to avoid years of delay that would deny relief to publishers. DOJ could also pursue disgorgement of Google’s illegally obtained profits, directing them to support news publishers harmed by its conduct. These steps would not only enhance competition in ad tech, they would help restore the revenue streams that sustain independent journalism. But even without these enhancements, the DOJ’s proposed remedies would still represent the most significant structural intervention in digital advertising markets in decades.

What the Remedies Mean for Competition

DOJ’s proposed ad tech remedies embrace the traditional goals of antitrust relief: unfetter the market, deny the violator the fruits of illegality, and prevent recurrence. That is the standard the Supreme Court articulated in cases like United Shoe and International Salt, and that is what is missing from Judge Mehta’s search remedies.

Where Judge Mehta’s final search remedies were narrow and deferential, trimming exclusivity but leaving defaults and payments intact, the ad tech proposals aim to remove the very conditions that allow Google to exclude rivals. If adopted, they would restore competition not by asking Google to behave better, but by restructuring the market so it no longer can tilt the playing field.

This is not just about advertisers and rivals. Google’s anticompetitive conduct raises costs for advertisers that ultimately flow down to consumers, reducing the diversity and quality of content available online. In short, consumers pay more and get less. The harms of Google’s ad tech monopoly also fall heavily on news publishers, especially local outlets that depend on fair returns from digital advertising to sustain journalism. By siphoning revenue through its conflicted control of the ad stack, Google deprived communities of reporting and accelerated the decline of independent media. Strong remedies in this case could help reestablish a healthier marketplace for journalism, which is a critical public good in a functioning democracy.

That difference matters. Remedies that leave exclusionary structures intact risk repeating the very cycle of dominance they are supposed to break. Remedies that restructure those conditions, by contrast, create real space for innovation, rivals, and choice; and in this case, a more diverse, quality online ecosystem for consumers to experience. 

The Path Ahead

DOJ’s proposed remedies for the ad tech case are a hopeful counterpoint to the search remedies decision. DOJ has once again shown what it looks like to design remedies that meet antitrust’s mandate: not just to stop bad behavior, but to restore fair competition. If adopted, they could realign the ad tech market in ways that directly benefit publishers, advertisers, and consumers. More importantly, they demonstrate that structural remedies are still being advocated. Judge Brinkema in Virginia has not yet ruled on remedies – the evidentiary hearings where the parties argue their implementation will begin later this month. 

We hope that Judge Brinkema does what Judge Mehta did not by imposing the necessary remedies that directly address the conduct she ruled illegal, and delivering real relief for consumers. Courts cannot stop bad behavior with just liability findings. They need to implement remedies that address the actual mechanisms of monopoly power and dismantle the conditions for exclusion altogether. Otherwise, the law risks validating hollow victories: rulings that confirm abuse but leave consumers and competitors no better off.